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SUMMARY:

Timely

This case presents the question whether an

~)~t

implied cause of action exists under the Fifth Amendment for a

~

federal employee discharged because of sex discrimination.

If

the Court were to recognize such an action, it would have to
resolve whether the Speech or Debate Clause or political question
doctrine b3rs a suit when the employer is a Congressman.

2.
FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

Petitioner was Deputy

Administrative Assistant to Congressman Otto Passman in 1974.
After six months of employment in that capacity, Congressman
Passman discharged her in a letter stating:
nyou a~e able, energetic and a very hard worker.
Certainly you cornrnar.d the respect of those wi th whom you
work~
however, on account of the unusually heavy work
load in my Washington Office, and the diversity of the
job, I concluded that it was essential that ~
understudy ~ to my Administrative Assistant be~
Petitioner bought suit against respondent, grounding her c ;a im on
an implied cause of action under the Fifth Amendment and
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403

u.s.

~ivens

388 (1971).

The district court dismissed for failure to state a
claim, ruling that petitioner's disch~ did not violate the
Fifth Amendment and that in any event Bivens did not extend to
the Fifth Amendment.

A panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed,

holding that the Fifth Amendment prohibited the conduct in
question and accorded petitioner an implied cause of action.
F.2d 865 (1977).

544

The panel also ruled that sovereign immunity

and the Speech or Debate Clause did not apply to this suit, and
that respondent enjoyed only a good faith and not an absolute
immunity from suit.

Because respondent had been voted out of

office in the interim, only damages were at issue.

Judge Jones

dissent~d ~ guing the suit violated the constitutional
separat~

of powers.

On rehearing en bane, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
panel and reinstituted the district court's dismissal of the

3.

,

suit.

571 F.2d 793 (1978).

Judge Clark's opinion for the

majority recognized that every circuit that had confronted the
question, including the Fifth, had extended Bivens to other
provisions of the Constitution, including the due process
guaranty of the Fifth Amendment.

The court was persuaded,

however, to reexamine its own precedents and to rule that an
implied cause of action was not necessary to effectuate the

\ --------

-

.

safeguards of that Amendment.

Applying the Cort v. Ash test

-----~

implying a cause of action from statutes, the court held that th

deliberate decision of Congress not to apply Title VII
militated against implication of an antidiscrimination cause of

-

~----~-------------

action here.

The court also expressed concern about the caseload

problems such an action might present.

In conclusion, the court

declared, "Given these consequences and our inability to
construct a plausible measure for acceptable limits on the right
of action Davis would have us imply to remedy the wrong alleged,
we refuse to take even a first step down the slippery slope until
the Supreme Court answers the open question of whether any such
right should exist."

Because of its resolution of the implied

cause of action issue, the majority did not address the Speech or

,_______________ - --

Debate or other immunity issues.
Judge Hill concurred specially, arguing that the staff
hiring decisions of Congressmen were relegated by the
~

Con :t~n ~o

the discretion of Congress and

to judicial interference.

we ~ ct

Judge Roney also concurred, arguing

that although it was appropriate to imply a cause of action to

4.
remedy invasions of fundamental liberties the origins of which
antedated the Constitution, the right not to be discharged from
employment on a discriminatory basis was a modern innovation that

.

did not demand the same kind of protection.

On this basis he

distinguished those cases in the Fifth Circuit and elsewhere
where an implied cause of action had been recognized.

-

Judge Goldber , joined by Chief Judge Brown, dissented
on the basis of his opinion for the panel.
recognizing that constitutional

,

attri~ion

He commented, "While
may be the benchmark of

the 1970's, I would leave it for the Supreme Court to place the
mark of Cain on Bivens' heretofore unblemished brow."
CONTENTIONS:

Petitioner argues that the decision below

is in conflict with decisions of five circuits, one of which was
subsequent to it, and is contrary to dicta expressed in four
other circuits.
5, 1978);

See Turpin v. Mailet, No. 77-7345 (2d Cir. Jun.

Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925 (8th Cir.

1977), vacated and remanded, 46 U.S.L.W. 3792 (U.S. Jun. 26,
1978);

Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353

(9th Cir. 1978);

States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d

1146 (4th Cir. 1974);

United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer,

457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972);

cf. De1lums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167

(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3803 (U.S. Jul. 3,
1978);

McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596 (7th Cir.), cert.

denied, 434

u.s.

966 (1977);

Yiamouyiannis v. Chemical Abstracts

Service, 521 F.2d 139Z (6th Cir. 1975);
United States, 515

u.s.

926

Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v.

(lOth Cir. 1975).

But cf. Kostka v.

I

5.
~'

560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977).

Petitioner also contends that
=.,.

the---use o_f _the Cort v. Ash analysis wa~ inap ropriate, as here
~ ----the Fifth Amendment requires implication of a remedy to vindicate

-

I

----

-

--......__

--

what would otherwise be an unremedied wrong.

The caseload

management argument is attacked as not borr: out by the lower
court's experience with Bivens.

Finally, petitioner asserts that

staff hiring is not the kind of activity recognized by previous
decisions of this Court as falling within the protection of the
Speech or Debate Clause.
DISCUSSION:

Although it does not appear that any other

circuit has dealt with the question whether Bivens applies to the
~ equal

\'

protection branch of the Fifth Amendment's due process

guaranty, the fact remains that every other circuit faced with
the problem has implied a cause of action with respect to
) assertions of due process rights.

--c------

Monroe v. Pape, 365

u.s.

~r

Before the recognition in

167 (1961), of section 1983 as an all

purpose cause of action against state officials, the decisions of
this Court regularly assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment
provided a cause of action against its violations.
parte Young, 209

u.s.

123 (1908).

See, e.g., Ex

These decisions would suggest

that a similar cause of action could be implied from the due
( process guaranty of the Fifth Amendment. The opinion in Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 u.s. 497 (1954), which held that race
discrimination perpetuated by the federal government violates the
Fifth Amendment, does not refer to a statutory basis for the
cause of action, and it seems fair to infer the Court believe~ the

a.
Constitution itself provided the right to sue.

Indirect support

for this proposition can be found in the statement in Butz v.
Economou, 46 U.S.L.W. 4952, 4959 (U.S. Jun. 29, 1978), that "To
create a system in which the Bill of Rights monitors more closely
the conduct of state officials than it does that of federal
officials is to stand the constitutional design on its head."
Whatever the merits of the dispute, the question decided
by the court below is an important one about which a substantial
conflict exists.

The federal courts have had considerable

experience with Bivens suits in the last seven years, and the
time seems ripe to reconsider the rationale of that decision and
determine whether it warrants extension.

The decision below

not limited to sex discrimination suits against Congressmen:
would apply to race discrimination, unwarranted incarceration
takings of property, and violations of the other individual
liberties protected specifically by the Fifth Amendment, and
all federal defendants against whom a statutory cause of
has not been created.
The subsidiary questions of separation of powers, Speech
or Debate Clause immunity, and the application of Butz to
Congressmen all seem independently certworthy, as none of the
decisions of this Court appear to be directly on point.
A response has not been filed, and should be called for
before a decision is made as to granting cert.

At this stage,

however, all the indications of certworthiness are present.
There is no response.
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~ s-tta. ... ~.J. c~~sAt the time of this case, respondent Passman was a .J. •

.

•

«1-~c 4Con"-

Congressman (I am not sure that he still is).

Petitioner ~ ~

was his deputy administrative assistant, having served

'-'"~

,

only ~

~

a few months, but apparently was employed with the view to

CJ:It;succeedinq the administrative assistant whose retirement

4

~ ~~~~

~

date was imminent.

t 0

Respondent terminated her employment, giving her '

'-AtL
LrTT

bf'·

notice in a rather indiscrete letter (see p. 4 of
petitioner's brief) in which he stated that in view of the
duties of the office he preferred to have a man.

Petitioner

brought suit, claiming sex discrimination in violation of
the Fifth Amendment.

She sought precuniary damages, not

just a right to Procedural due process before beinq relieved
of her job.
Title VII was extended to civil service employees
of the federal government only in 1972, but apparently the
Amendment embracinq civil servants explicitly excluded staff
personnel of Congressmen.

The briefs indicate that they

•..----------~.~-----------------------~-----~~------------------------~------~·~-~-

2.
were viewed as "noncompetitive" federal employees.

(I have

not checked the Amendment to Title VII or the requlations,
and did not focus clearly on these as I read the briefs.)
In any event, it seems to be conceded that
petitioner could look to no statute or regulation giving her
a cause of action.

She therefore relied on a Bivens type of

implied cause of action from the Fifth Amendment.
CA 5, en bane, held by a 12 to 2 vote that a

(

Bivens cause of action for damages cannot be implied from
the Fifth Amendment.
Several rationales were identified, including an
interesting one by Judge Roney who concluded that a
constitutional cause of action for money damages may be
implied only where the damage remedy is rooted in
preconstitutionj~J

"notions of tort law".

Respondent, in addition to relying on the various
opinions of CA 5, argues fundamentally that Bivens should
not be extended beyond the Fourth Amendment.
Perhaps the strongest argument, and one that has
considerable appeal to me, is that Congress deliberately
intended that its members should retain control over their
personal staffs.

The history of the Amendment to Title VII

should be examined with this in view.

It is not easy to

believe that Congress voluntarily would foreclose the right
'.

of its members to exercise virtually absolute control over

3.
the "hiring and firing" of their office personnel.

The

reasons for this are easy to perceive, not the least is the
type of loyalty an elected official needs in the
relationships with constituents.
Of course, if the Constitution confers a right to
damages for sex discrimination, Conqress could not legislate
an exemption for itself unless the Speech or Debate Clause
protects its members.

Respondent relies on that Clause,

althouqh I find considerable difficulty in stretching it to
cover this case.

I am presently unpersuaded, however, that

-

the Constitution requires us to recognize a Bivens type

v. ~

cause of action where Congress itself has not - as it did in

iv<.

Title VII - provide for the cnuse of action.

~

htM..:k-1

The case is one of considerable importance, an ~ltw~-~~~
certainly of special interest "on the Hill".
want a memorandum from you.

d-;;-z;:;_--·

I therefore

If I am on the right track in

what I have indicated above, the memorandum can focus
primarily in support of that view.

I do not

course, other views.

~

~

foreclos~, of ~

~

~
JA.-~

5"~~:

L.F.P., Jr.
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BOBTAIL BENCH MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul
Davis v. Passman, No. 78-5072
February 24, 1979
The principal issue in this case appears to be the

propriety of implying a damages remedy for acts of employment
discrimination by a Congressman.

The Speech or Debate Clause

question does not seem substantial, and I will not discuss it
here.

My own impression is that it would be inappropriate to

extend Bivens to this case, but that to reach this result some
revision of the criteria expressed in that case will be
necessary.

' 2.

The power of a federal court to imply a damages remedy
in situations such as this was settled in Bivens;
of exercising that power is the issue here.

the propriety

Justice Brennan's

opinion for the Court in Bivens contains the following discussion
of the point:
"Finally, we cannot accept respondents' formulation
of the question as whether the availability of
money damages is necessary to enforce the Fourth
Amendment.
For we have here no explicit
congressional declaration that persons injured by a
federal officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment
may not recover money damages from the agents, but
must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally
effective in the view of Congress. The question is
f he can demonstrate an
merely whether petitioner,@
injury consequent upon the violation by federal
agents of his Fourth Amendment rights, is entitled
to redress his injury through a particular remedial
mechanism normally available in the federal courts.
Cf. J •. I . • Ca9e Co. v. Borak, 377 u.s. 426, 433
(1964);
Jaco6s v. United States, 290 u.s. 13, 16
(1933)."
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents, 403 · u.s. 388,397 (1971).
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion is more elaborate with
respect to this question.

He begins his analysis with the

following general observation:
"[I]t must also be recognized that the Bill of
Rights is particularly intended to vindicate the
interests of the individual in the face of the
popular will as expressed in legislative
majorities;
at the very least, it strikes me as no
more appropriate to await express congressional
authorization of traditional judicial relief with
regard to these legal interests than with respect
to interests protected by federal statutes.
"The question then, is, as I see it, whether
compensatory relief is 'necessary' or 'appropriate'
to the vindication of the interest asserted. Cf.
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, • • • • In resolving that
question, it seems to me that the range of policy
considerations we may take into account is at least
as broad as the range of those a legislature would
consider with respect to an express statutory

3.

authorization of a traditional remedy."
407.

Id~,

at

The considerations militating in favor of implying a remedy were,
in Justice Harlan's view, the familiarity of the courts with
litigation affecting the kinds of interests involved in Fourth
Arnendent claims, the danger that state law limitations will
undercut effective relief, and the fact that damages often will
be the only available remedy.

The only countervailing policy he

perceived, docket size, was insufficient to outweigh these
considerations.
Summarizing these opinions, a fair reading of Justice
Brennan's position would be that a damages remedy always will be
implied for the violation of a constitutional right, absent
creation by Congress of an acceptable alternative remedy.
Justice Harlan's position would look to a wider range of
considerations, but a key factor would be whether the individual
in the particular case could otherwise receive adequate relief
for the injury suffered.
The problem with both these approaches, as I perceive
it, is the exclusive focus on the individual's power to rectify
particular injuries.

They overlook the situation where Congress

has preempted a field by enacting a comprehensive remedial
scheme, but in so doing has chosen to leave a small class of
individuals without effective relief.

In more general terms,

both approaches overlook the context in which the claim is
asserted and instead look only at the interest asserted by the
victim of the constitutional violation.

4.
The Fourth Amendment and the rights it protects
traditionally have been the almost exclusive concern of the
courts.

The exclusionary rule, as fashioned in Weeks and

extended to the States in Mapp, is the product of judicial
innovation, in large part because of the failure of legislative
bodies to provide alternative means of guarding the interests
implicated by the Fourth Amendment.
U.S. 465, 482-489 (1976)

Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428

(discussing relationship between the

general social purposes of the Fourth Amendment and the
judicially-created remedy of exclusionary rule).

Perhaps because

of the inherent conflict between the Fourth Amendment and law
enforcement, neither legislatures nor members of the executive
branches of federal, state, and local governments have taken on
their own effective steps to ensure the respect for individual
dignity and privacy the Fourth Amendment was meant to guarantee.
Bivens is a natural product of judicial activism in an area where
constitutional rights have been neglected by the other branches
of government.

Cf. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking--

Judges Who

Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 787 (1963).
Justice Harlan implied as much when he observed in

eyiven~

that

"the judiciary has a particular responsibility to assure the
vindication of constitutional interests such as those embraced by
the Fourth Amendment."

403

u.s.,

at 407.

It is not as clear that the judiciary has a particular
responsibilty to assure the vindication of the constitutional
interests involved in employment discrimination.

Unlike the

Fourth Amendment area, when congressional action has been

5.

piecemeal (limited to Title III of the Safe Streets Act, as far
as I am aware), Congress has taken the laboring oar in regulating
employment discrimination.

Sections 1981, 1983, and Title VII

together constitute a comprehensive scheme for adressing this
problem, with the balancing and tradeoffs such a scheme entails.
These measures are part of an even larger program involving the
prohibition of racial and gender-based discrimination in all
facets of life.
Judicial implication of remedies in an area Congress
already has occupied would upset judgments made and compromises
struck.

In this case, Congress has chosen not to provide a

damages remedy for certain congressional staff, in spite of its
obvious concern with the general problem of employment
discrimination and the vigorous steps it has taken to eradicate
the phenomenon in other areas.
reverse that decision.

The implication of a remedy would

The fact that Congress does not appear to

have documented the reasons for its decision on this point should
be immaterial.

Perhaps the exemption resulted from a compromise,

or perhaps the unseemliness of taking individual congressmen to
court for his personal hiring decisions seemed too obvious for
explanation.

Perhaps rank hypocrisy is involved.

My guess is

that all of these motives and more could be attributed to various
individual members.

The point is that Congress clearly has made

a decision as to this issue, and the application of Bivens here
would reverse it.

A similar criticism could not be made with

respect to the facts in Bivens.
The obvious objection to this approach is that it leaves

6.

some individuals whose rights have been violated without any
effective relief.

One could respond that equitable relief still

might be available, but I am not sure you would wish to go that
far.

Holding a Congressman in contempt for refusing to rehire a

staff person is even more unpalatable than holding him liable in
damages.

A better answer, I think, is that not every violation

of the constitution can or should be remedied by a federal court.
On the facts of this case, it is not at all clear that a damages
award will be as effective a deterrent of employment
discrimination as publicity and attendant political retaliation.
(It is interesting to note that Passman is now an ex-Congressman,
although his criminal involvement in the Koreagate scandal may
have had something to do with that).

Furthermore, state remedies

might still be available, although as the relevant State often
will be the District of Columbia I am not sure this is a
satisfactory answer.
In sum, what I recommend is a narrower conception of the
responsibilities of the federal judiciary than that articulated
in Bivens.

Rather than assuming that the judiciary has a free

rein to craft a remedy for every invasion of a federallyprotected interest, with express congressional direction limiting
the choice of remedy but not the existence of a remedy vel · non, I
think the Court should look first to determine whether the rights
asserted belong to a class traditionally relegated to judicial
protection or rather fall within the scope of a general statutory
regulatory program.

If the rights fall within a latter category,

I think the Court should be very reluctant to upset whatever

7.

legislative judgments went into the decision not to extend the
general legislative program to the particular claim asserted.

As

long as the exemption itself does not constitute a form of
invidious discrimination, it should be honored.
This approach would amount to a retrenchment from
Bivens, although it would preserve what I believe is fundamental
in that decision.

I think the retrenchment is warranted as a

matter of policy, and I do not believe there is any decision of
the Court that you have joined which would stand in the way.

The

result in this case would be consistent with the spirit, if not
the letter, of Brown v.

~'

425

u.s.

820 (1976), insofar as the

latter decision recognizes Congress meant the 1972 amendment of
Title VII to be the exclusive remedy for federal employees
claiming employment discrimination.
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SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul
Davis v. Passman, No. 78-5072
February 28, 1979
Judge Jones, in the court below, argued that principles

of separation of powers, rather than the interpretation of
Bivens, should govern the outcome of this case.

See app. 57-59.

I do not think the issue can be whether the dispute here involves
a "political question", the doctrine under which separation of
powers problems traditionally have been handled.
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-697
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486

(1969)~

(1974)~

See United
Powell v.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186

2.

u.s.

(1962);

Pacific States · Tel. &

(1912).

If a case fell within the scope of that doctrine, a

Tel~

Co. v. Oregqn, 223

118

federal court could not entertain it regardless of Congress'
explicit creation of jurisdiction.
Cranch 137 (1803).

Cf. Marbury v. Madison,

Yet here Congress clearly could enact a

statute giving federal courts jurisdiction to adjudicate
controversies of this sort.

For this reason, I believe the

separation-of-powers doctrine does not apply to this case of its
own force.
This does not mean, however, than separation-of-powers
considerations have no role to play in applying Bivens, as I
should have indicated in my memorandum to you.

The Court can and

should consider these principles in determining whether to imply
a damages remedy.

The argument goes more or less like this:

falling into "the range of policy considerations [the Court] may
take into account," Bivens, at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring), is
the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of
other branches of government.

Cf. United States v. Nixon, suera.

In a case where the logic of Bivens otherwise would point toward
implication of a damages remedy, the Court should take into
account the special circumstance that the dispute involves the
workings of a coordinate branch of government.

This

consideration outweighs the grounds for implying an action.
An opinion written along these lines would be much
narrower than what I outlined to you earlier.

In essence the

decision would be confined to causes · of actions such as this one,
and would not disturb the application of Bivens to the Fifth or

3.

Fourteenth Amendments generally.
have to be made:

At bottom the same point would

There are some deprivations of constitutional

rights for which the federal courts may not provide a remedy.
The political question cases also are relevant to this point, as
they stand for the proposition that the Constitution does deprive
the federal courts of some power to redress constitutional
violations.
To my mind, the approach I outlined in my earlier
memorandum is more satisfying as a matter of abstract logic.

I

am a bit troubled by the idea, necessarily implied by the
argument outlined above, that the existence of a remedy for
violations of one's rights depends to some extent on who the
defendant is.

I also would prefer to see a broader principle

expressed that would contain Bivens, as I think the wisdom of
judicial implication of damages remedies is not as clear as
perhaps seemed a decade ago.

What seems attractive as a matter

of logic, however, may be neither practical nor acceptable to a
majority of the Court.

In any prevent, I apologize for not

addressing these arguments earlier.
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delivered the opinion of the Court.
Bivens v. Si:r Unknown .\·arned Agents of the Federal Bureau of l\'arcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), held that a "cause of
action for damages" arises under the Constitution when
Fourth Amendment rights are violated. The issue presented
Gf~~dV'
for decision in this case is whether a cause of action and a
damages remedy can also be implied directly under the Con~""\(. ~ur
stitution when the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend~_ I(. OJI"~ ment is violated. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
r 11
•
en bane, concluded that "no civil action for damages'' can be
&AAA-t\AA, ~
thus implied. 571 F. 2d 793. 801 (1978). We granted cer1
fl,/1. 'I ~NC
tiorari,- U.S.- (1978), and we now reverse.
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN
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I
At the time this case commenced. respondent Otto E.
Passman was a l'"nited States Congressman from the Fifth
Congressional District of Louisiana.' On February 1, 1974.
Passman hired petitioner Shirley Davis as a deputy administrative assistant.~ Passman subsequently terminated her
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employment, effective July 31. 1974, writing Davis that,
although "you are able. energetic and a very hard worker, ...
I concluded that it was essential that the understudy to my
Administrative Assistant be a man." 3 App .. at 6.
Davis brought suit in the United States District Court for
8

The full test of

Pnl'~man's

letter is as follows:

"Dear Mrs. Davis:
"My Washington staff joins me in sa~·ing that wr miss you very much.
But, in all probability, inward!~· they all agree that I wa~ doing you an
injusticr b~· asking ~·ou to as:;umr a reHpon:;ibilit~· that was so trying and
so hard that it would have taken all of the pblHure out of your work.
I must be completely fair with you , so plra~e note the following:
"You are able, energetic and a very hard worker. Certainly ~·ou command the respect of those with whom ~·ou work; however, on account of
the unusually heavy work load in my Wa:;hington Office, and the diversity
of the job, I concluded that it was e~:;ential that the understud~· to my
Administrative As::;istant be a man. I believe you will agree with this
conclusion.
"It would be unfair to you for me to ask you to waste your talent
and experiPnce in my Monroe officr because of the low salary that is
available because of a junior position. Therefore, and so that your
experience and talent rna~· be used to advantage in some organization in
need of an extremely capablr secretary, I de:;ire that you be continued
on the payroll at ~·our present salary through .July 31, 1974. This arrangement gives you your full year's vacation of one month, plu:-; one additional
month. May I further say that the work load in the Monroe office is·
very limited, and since you would come in a~ a junior member of the·
staff at ;;uch a low salary, it would actually be an offen:;e to you.
"I know that secretaries with your ability are very much in demand in
Monroe. If an additional letter of rrcommendation from me would be·
advantageous to you, do not he~itatr to let me know. Again, a:;suring you
that my Washington staff and your humble Congressman feel that the·
contribution you made to our Wa:;hington office has helped all of us.
"With best wishes,
Sincerely,
j::;j Otto E. Passman
OTTO E. PASSMAN
Member of Congress.'"
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the Western District of Louisiana, alleging that Passman's
conduct discriminated against her "on the basis of sex in
violation of the United States Constitution and the Fifth
Amendment thereto." !d., a.t 4. Davis sought damages in
the form of backpa.y. /d., at 5. 4 Jurisdiction for her suit was
founded on 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a), which provides in pertinent part that federal "district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in contro·
versy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 ... and arises
under the Constitution ... of the United States."
Passman moved to dismiss Davis' action for failure to state
9, claim upon which relief can be granted, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
12 (b)(6), arguing, inter alia, that "the law affords no private
right of action" for her claim." App., at 8. The District
Court accepted this argument, ruling that Davis had "no
private right of action." !d., at 9. 6 A panel of the Court o{
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 544 F. 2d 865 (1977).
The panel concluded that a cause of action for damages arose
directly under the Fifth Amendment; that, taking as true the
allegations in Davis' complaint, Passman's conduct violated
the Fifth Amendment; and that Passman's conduct was not
shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution 1
Art. I, § 6, cl. 1,7
Davis also sought equitable relief, a~ well as a promotion and salary
increase. App., at 4-5. Since Pas~man i~ no longer a CongreH:sman,
however, see fl. 1, supra, the:;e form~ of relief arc no longer available.
5 Passman also argued that his allcgt>d conduct was "not violative of the
Fifth Amendment to tht> Constitution," and that relief wa~ barred "by
reason of the :sovereign immunity doctrine and the official immunity doctrine." App., at 8.
6 The District Court al:;o ruled that, although "thr doctrines of ~OYereign
and official immunity" did not just if~· dismi:;:sal of Davis' complaint, "the'
di:;charge of plaintiff on alleged grounds of SPX discrimination b~· defrndant
is not violative of the Fifth Amendment to thr Constitution." App., at 9.
7 The panel abo held that, although sovereign immunity did not bar a;
damages award against Pa,.;;;man individually, he was entitled at trial t8
a defense of qualified immunity.
4
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en bane,
reversed the decision of the panel. The en bane Court did
not reach the merits, nor discuss the application of the Speech
or Debate Clause. The Court instead held that "no right of
action may be implied from the Due Process Clause of the
fifth amendment." 571 F. 2d, at 801. The Court reached
this conclusion on the basis of the criteria that had been set
out in Cart v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975), for determining
whether a private cause of action should be implied from a
federal statute. 8 Noting that Congress had failed to create a
The criteria set out in Cart v. Ash. supra, are:
"First, is the plaintiff 'one of the cla~s for whose especial bem•fit the
statute was enacted,' Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 39
(1916) (emphasis supplird)-that is. doe~ the statute create a federal
right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, i~ there any indicatiou of legislative inteut, explicit or implicit, rithcr to create such a remedy or to deny
one? See, e. g., Nat:ional Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of
Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 458, 460 (1974) (Amtrak). Third,
is it consistent with the undrrlying purpo~Ps of the legislative scheme to
imply such a remed~· for the plaintiff? See, e. g., Amtrak, supra; Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U. S. 412, 423 (1975);.
Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U. S. 134 (1964). And finally, is the cause of
action one traditionally relrgated to state law, in an area basically the
concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to inJer a cause
of action basrd solely on federal law? Ser Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S.
647, 652 (1963); cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 434 (1964);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 394-395
(1971); id., at 400 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment)." 422 U. S.,
at 78.
The Court of Appeals had some difficulty applying these criteria to
determine whrther a cause of action should be implied under the Constitution. It eventually concluded, howevrr, (1) that although "the fifth
amendment right to due process certainly conferl:i a right upon Davis, the
injury allrged here doel:i not infringe this right as directly as" the violation
of the Fourth Amendment rights alleged in Bivens, 571 F. 2d, at 797;
(2) that "[clongrr~sional rrmedial legislation for employmmt discrimination has carefully avoided creating a cause of action for money damages
for one in Davis' position," id., at 798; (3) that, unlike violations of the
8
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damages remedy for those in Davis' position , the Court also
concluded that "the proposed damage remedy is not constitutionally compelled" so that it was not necessary to "countermand the clearly discernible will of Congress" and create such
a remedy. 571 F. 2d, at 800.
II
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, supra, federal agents had allegedly
arrested and searched Bivens without probable cause. thereby
subjecting him to great humiliation, embarrassment, and
mental suffering. Bivens held that the Fourth Amendment
guarantee against "unreasonable searches and seizures" was a
constitutional right which Bivens could enforce through a
private cause of action, and that a damages remedy was an
appropriate form of redress. Last Term, Butz v. Economou,
U. S. (1978) , reaffirmed this holding, stating that
"the decision in Bivens ... established that a citizen suffering a compensable injury to a constitutionally protected
interest could invoke the general federal question jurisdiction
of the district courts to obtain an award of monetary damages
against the responsible federal official." I d., at - .
Today we hold that Bivens and Butz require reversal of the
holding of the en bane Court of Appeals. Our inquiry proceeds in three stages. We hold first that, pretermitting the
question whether respondent's conduct is shielded by the
Speech or Debate Caluse, the right asserted by petitioner
is justiciable; second, that petitioner has stated a cause of
action which asserts this right; and third, that relief m
damages constitutes an appropriate form of remedy.
Fourth Amendment, "the breadth of the concept of due process indicates
that the damage remedy sought will not be judicially manageable," id.,.
at 799 ; and ( 4) that implying a cause of action under the Due Process
Clause would creat e "the danger of deluging 'federal rourts with claims
otherwise redre:;sable in state courts or admin b trative proceedings . . .._,.
/d .) at 800,

78-5072-0PINION
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A
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . ." In numerous decisions, this Court
"has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids the Federal Government from denying equal
protection of the laws. E. g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426 U. S. 88, 100 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 93
(1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 638 n. 2
(1975); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (19M)." Vance
v. Bradley, U. S. - , n. 1 (1979). "To withstand
scrutiny under the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 'classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.'
Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190. 197 (1976)." Califano v.
Webster, 430 U. S. 313, 316-317 ( 1977) .9
The Equal Protection Component of the Due Process Clause
thus confers on petitioner a federal constitutional right to be
free from gender discrimination which cannot meet these
requirements. 10 Respondent argues, however, that in this case
such a right is nonjusticiable because judicial determination of
the "important governmental objectives" served by gender9 Before it can be determined whrther petitioner's Fifth Amendment
right has been violated, therefore, inquiry mm;t be undertaken into what
"important governmental objectives," if any, arr ~erved by the genderbased employment of congrel:isional Rtaff. See n. 20, infra. We express
no views as to the outcome of thi;; inquiry. We note only that if such
gender-based employment doe;; not serve "important governmental objectives" or is not ";;ubstantially related to thr achirvrmrnt" of such objectives, the requirements of the Fifth Amendment will have been violated.
10 This right is personal ; it is petitioner, aftrr all, who mu;;t suffrr the
effects of such di;;crimination. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, U.S.-,- n. 13 (1979); Mouongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,
148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893),
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based employment of congressional staff will necessarily involve
a "lack of respect due coordinate branches of government."
Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217 ( 1962). Respondent fears
that if petitioner's right is enforced, "the judiciary soon will
be dictating to Congressmen and Congresswomen how their
legislative responsibilities should be performed in the sense
that it will dictate by whom they should be performed."
Brief for Respondent 22.
We disagree. The Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 6, cl. 1. functions "to protect the integrity of · the legislative process by insuring the independence
of individual legislators." United States v. Brewster, 408
U. S. 501, 507 (1972). It is a paradigm example of "a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [anJ
issue to a coordinate political department." Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). A Congressman must of course be
free to hire the staff necessary for him to function "within the
'sphere of legitimate legislative activity.' " Eastla:nd v.
United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491, 501 (1975).
See Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 616-617 ( 1972).
· If petitioner's employment was in fact of this nature. respondent will be shielded with absolute immunity by the Clause,
"not only from the consequences of litigation's results. but
also from the burden of defending [himself].'' Dombrowski"
v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82, 85 ( 1967). But if respondent's conduct is not protected by the Clause, it will be because petitioner's position was so unrelated to "the legislative process" that
the institutional interests of the Congress as a coordinate
department will not be impaired by judicial review of respondent's liability for the termination of her employment.
The en bane Court of Appeals did not decide whether
respondent was shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause. We
also intimate no view on that issue. '"e conclude only that
if the Clause should not apply. the question whether respondent's dismissal of petitioner violated her Fifth Am.enillnent

78-5072-0PINION
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rights would, as we stated in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486 (1969),
"require no more than an interpretation of the Constitution. Such a determination falls within the traditional
role accorded courts to interpret the law. and does not
involve a 'lack of respect due [a] coordinate branch of
government,' nor does it involve an 'illitial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.'
Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, at 217." 395 U. S., at
548-549.
We hold, therefore, that if respondent's dismissal of petitioner
was not within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, petitioner's claim
sets forth a justiciable right. We inquire next whether petitioner has a cause of action to assert this right.

B
It is clear that the District Court had jurisdiction under 28
U. S. C. § 1331 (a) to consider petitioner's claim. Bell v.
Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946). It is equally clear, and the
en bane Court of Appeals so held. that the Fifth Amendment
confers on petitioner a constitutional right to be free from
illegal discrimination. 11 Yet the Court of Appeals concluded
that petitioner could not enforce this right because she lacked
e. cause of action. The meaning of this missing "cause of
action," however, is far from apparent.
Almost half a. century ago Justice Cardozo rec0gnized that
a "'cause of action' may mean one thing for one purpose and
something different for another." United States v. Memphis
11 The rE-straints of the Fifth Amendment rE-ach far enough to embrace
the official actions of a CongrE>,.;~man in hiring and di,.;missing his employees. That re:,;pondent'R conduct may have lwE>n illegal does not ~ufficE'
to transform it into merely private action. "[Plower, oncE' granted, does
not disappenr like a magic gift when it is wrongfully used." Bivens-,
supra, at 392. See Home Telephone and TeleflU¥pfh Co. v. Los An(leles.
22.7 U.S. 278, 287-289 (]913)·.
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Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 67-68 (1933). 1 " The phrase
apparently became a legal term of art when the New York
Code of 1848 abolished the distinction between actions at law
and suits in equity and simply required a plaintiff to include
in his complaint "[a] statement of the facts constituting the
cause of action . . " 13 New York Code of Practice in Civil
Actions § 120 (2) (1848). By the first third of the 20th
eentury, however, the phrase had become so encrusted with
do(·trinal complexity that the authors of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure eschewed it altogether, requiring only that a
complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 8 (a). See Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre,
Inc., 133 F. 2d 187, 189 (CA2 1943). Nevertheless, courts and
commentators have continued to use the phrase "cause of
action" in the traditional sense established by the Codes to
refer roughly to the alleged invasion of "recognized legal
rightr." upon which a litigant bases his claim for relief. 14
Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S.
682, 693 (1949).
12 See United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745, 748 (1947); Arnold,
The Code 'Cause of Action' Clarified by United States Supreme Court, 19
A. B. A. J. 215 (1933).
13 See Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 Yale L ..T. 817, 820 (1924);
Blume, The Scope of a Civil Action, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 257 (1943).
14 See, e. g., United States v. Employing Plasterers Association, 347 U. S.
186 (1954); 2A Moore's Federal Practice ~f 8.13, at 1704-1705 ("Perhap~
it i~ not entirely accuratf' to- say, as one court ha:s said, that 'it is only
necessary to state a claim in the pleadings ... and not a cause of action.'
While the Rules have substituted 'claim' or 'claim for rrlief' in lieu of the
older and troublesome term 'cause of action,' the pleading still must state
a 'cause of action' in the sense that it mu:st show 'that the pleader is
entitled to relief.' It i~ not enough to indicate merely that the plaintiff
has a grievance but sufficient detail must be given :so that the defendant,
and the court, can obtain a fair idea of what the plaintiff is complaining,
and cnn see that here i:s ;;orne legal basis for recovery.'') (footnotes
omitted).
There was, of course, great controver:sy concerning the exact meaning

'f8-50'12-0PINION
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This is not the meaning of the "cause of action" which the
Court of Appeals below refused to imply from the Fifth
Amendment, howevm~, for the Court acknowledged that petitioner had alleged on invasion of her constitutional right to
be free from illegal discrimination.'" Instead the Court of
Appeals appropriated the meaning of the phrase "cause of
action" used in the many cases in which this Court has parsed
congressional enactments to detf'rmine whether the rights and
obligations so created could be judicially enforced by a particular "class of litigants." Cannon v. University of Chica{Jo,
U. S. - , (1979). Securities Investor Protect'ion
Corp. (SIPC) v. Barbour, 421 U. S. 412 (1975), for example,
held that although "Congress' primary purpose in . . . creating the SIPC was ... the protection of investors." and
although investors were thus "thf' intended beneficiaries of the
[Securities Investor Protectionl Act rof 1970]," 84 Stat. 1636,
15 U. S. C. § 78aaa et seq., investors nevertheless had no
private cause of action judicially to compel SIPC "to commit
its funds or otherwise to act for the protection" of investors.
I d., at 418, 421. We held that under the Act only the
Securities and Exchange Commission had a cause of action
enabling it to invoke judicial authority to require SIPC toof the phrase "rau:-:e of action" in the Codr~. Ser ill .. at § 2.0o, p. 359
n. 26; J. Pomeroy, Code Renwdie,; 406-·Hil (4th ed. 190-+) ; Wheaton, Thr
Code 'Cau~e oJ Action': It~ Definition, 22 Com. L. Q. 1 (1906); Clark,
supra n. 13, at 837.
15 The Court of Appeals apparenlly found that petitionrr larkrd a
"cau~e of action" in the sense that a ca11,.:r of adion wo11ld havP been
~upplied by 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Chapman "· Jlouston U'Pljare Rio/it's
Org., U. S. (1979), !wid earlier thi,.: Term that, altho11gh § 1!.}1:13
~erves "to ensme that an individual I haH I a <':lll:<C of :i(·tion for violatio11~
of the Constitution," the ~tatute it:-:elf "dor;; not ~l'!'Ure and providr :Ill)'
rights at all." !d., at - . Srction 19i':~, of <'OIIW:' , providr;;: a can:-;r of
action only for deprivation" of constitutio11al right~ that O('CIII' "under color·
of any statute, ordi11ance, regulation, ru~tom, or u,.:age, of any StaJe ·or·
Terr\tory," and thu~ has no application to this case,
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perform its statutory obligations. On the other hand, Texa8
& N. 0. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930), held
that § 2 of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 577, 45
U. S. C. § 152, which provides that railroad employees be able
to designate representatives "without interference, influence,
or coercion," did not confer "merely an abstract right," but
was judicially enforceable through a private ·cause of action. 10
/d., at 558, 567-568.
In cases such as these, the question is which class of litigants may enforce in court legislatively created rights or
obligations. If a litigant is an appropriate party to invoke
the power of the courts, it is said that he has a "cause of
action" under the statute, and that this cause of action is a
necessary element of his "claim.n So understood, the question
whether a litigant has a "cause of action" is analytically
distinct and prior to the question of what relief. if any, a
litigant may be entitled to receive. The concept of a "cause
of action" is employed specifically to determine who may
judicially enforce the statutory rights or obligations. 17
16 Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Ra'iZ.way Cle1·ks, supra, is now understood as·
having implied a "cause of action" although the opinion ittie!f did not use·
the phrase. See Cannon v. University of Chicago. supra, a t - n . 13.
17 Thus it may be said that jurisdiction i~ a que~tion of whether a federal'
court has the power, under the Constitution or laws of the United States,
to hear a case, see Mansfield. Cold'water & Lake Michigan Ry. Co. v.
Swain, 111 U. S. 379, 384 (1884) ; Montana-Dakota Utilities Co . v.
N orthwestem P·ublic Service Co., 341 U. S. 246, 249 (1951); standing is
a qu'estion of whether a plaintiff is sufficiently ad\'ersary to a defendant
to create an Art. III case or controver~y, or at least to overcome prudential limitations on federal court jurisdiction, see Warth v. Seldin , 422'.
U. S. 490, 498 (1975); cause of action is a question of whether a particular plaintiff is a member of the clatis of litigants that may, as a matter·
of law, appropriately invoke the power of the court; and relief is a question of the various remedies a federal court may make a\·ailable. A
plaintiff may have a cause of action even though he be entitled to no·
relief a.t all, as,, for exa~le;. whldl a defendant in a slllli.t fot da.nw~es iii;
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It is in this sense that the Court of Appeals concluded that
petitioner lacked a cause of action. The Court of Appeals
reached this conclusion through the application of the criteria
set out in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975). for ascertaining
whether a private cause of action may be implied from "a
statute not expressly providing one." ld., at 78. 1 8 The Court
of Appeals used these criteria to determine that those in
petitioner's position should not be able to enforce the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, and that petitioner therefore had no cause of action under the Amendment. · This was
error, for the question of who may enforce a statutory right is
fundamentally different than the question of who may enforce·
a right that is protected by the Constitution.
clothed with absolute immunity. See St'Ump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349'
(1978).
The Court of Appeals appeared to confuse the quf'stion of whether petitioner had standing with the question of whf'tlwr she:> had asserted a proper
cause of action. See Natiorw.l Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 465 n. 13 (1974). Although
the Court acknowledged the existence of petitioner's constitutional right,
571 F. 2d, at 797-798, it concluded that she had no cause of action in
part because "the injury allegc:>d here does not infringe this right as
directly as the injury inflicted in the unreasonable search of Webster
.Bivens offended the fourth amendment." !d., at 797. The nature of
petitioner's injury, however, is relevant to the determination of whether
she has "alleged ;;uch a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adversenes,; which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr. 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962).
And under the criteria we have :set out, petitioner clearly ha;; ~tanding to·
bring this suit. If the allegations of her complaint are taken to be true,
she has shown that ;;he "personally has suffered some actual or threatened· ·
injury as a result of the putative illegal conduct of the defendant."Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood. U. S. - , (1979).
Whether petitioner has at:serted a cause of action, however, depends not
on the quality or extent of her injury, but on whether the class of litigants
of which petitioner is a member may use the courts to enforce the right
at iEsue. The focus must therefore be on the nature of the right peti-ticiner a~serts.
18

See n. 8, s'Upra,

18-5072-0Pl NION

DAVIS v. PASSMAN

13

Statutory rights and obligations are established by Congress,
and it is entirely appropriate for Congress, in creating these
rights and obligations, to determine in addition who may
enforce them and in what manner. For example, statutory
rights and obligations are often embedded in complex regulatory schemes, so that if they are not enforced through private
causes of action, they may nevertheless be enforced through
alternative mechanisms, such as criminal prosecut:ons, see
Cart v. Ash, supra, or other public causes of actions. See
S "Jcurities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, supra; National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of
Railroad Passengers, supra, at 457. In each case, however,
the question is the nature of the legislative intent informing
a specific statute, and Cart set out the criteria through which
this intent could be discerned.
The Constitution, on the other hand, does not "partake of
the prolixity of a legal code." M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 407 (1819). It speaks instead with a majestic
simplicity. One of "its important objects," ibid., is the designation of rights. And in "its great outlines," ibid., the
judicia.ry is clearly discernible as the primary means through
which these rights may be enforced. As James Madison
stated when he presented the Bill of Rights to the Congress:
"If [these rights] are incorporated into the Constitution,
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves
in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they
will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will
be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights
expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights. " 1 Annals of Congress 439 (Gales &
Seaton , eds. 1834).
At least in the absence of "a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate
political department," Baker v. Carr, supra, at 217, we presume that justiciable constitutional rights are to be en-
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forced through the courts. And. unless such rights are to
become merely precatory, the class of those litigants who
allege that their own constitutional rights have been violated.
and who at the same time have no effective means other than
the judiciary to enforce these rights. must be able to invoke
the existing .i urisdiction of the courts for the protection of
their justiciable constitutional rights. "The very essence of
civil liberty," wrote Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803), "certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury." Traditionally, therefore,
"it is the established practice for this Court to sustain the
jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions to protect
rights safeguarded by the Constitution a.nd to restrain individual state officers from doing what the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the State to do." Bell v. Hood, supra, at 684.
See Bivens, supra, at 400 (Harlan , J. , concurring in judgment). Indeed, this Court has already settled that a cause
of action may be implied directly under the Equal Protection
Component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in favor of those who seek to enforce this constitutional
right. 19 The plaintiffs in Bolling v. Sharpe , 347 U. S. 497
(1954). for example, claimed that they had been refused
admission into certain public schools in the District of Columbia solely on account of their race, .They rested their suit
directly on the Fifth Amendment and on the general federal
question jurisdiction of the district courts, 28 U. S. C. § 1331..
·The District Court dismissed their complaint for failure "to·
state a claim upon which relief can be gra.nted." Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 12 (b)( 6). This Court reversed. Plaintiffs were·
clearly the appropriate parties to bring such a suit, and this
Jacobs v. Uuited States, 290 U. S. 13 (1933) , held that a plaintiff who
alleged that his proper~· had been taken by the Unit ed State::> for public
use without just compensation could bring suit directly under the Fifth:
Amendment,
19
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Court held that equitable relief should be made available.
349 u.s. 294 (1955).
Like the plaintifl"s in Bolling v. Sharpe, supra, petitioner
rests her claim directly on the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. She claims that her rights under the
Amendment have been violated, and that she has no efl"ective
means other than the judiciary to vindicate these rights. 20
2

°

Clausp 9 of Rule XLIII of the House of ReprPsPntativPs prohibits sex
discrimination as part of thP CodP of Official Conduct of tlw House:
"A Membf'r. official or Pmployep of tlw Hou~c of Repre~entative~ shall
not dischargr or refusE' to hirP any individual, or othPrwisP discriminate
ngainst any individual with rPsppct to compen~ation, tprm~, conditions, or
priviiPgrs of employmPnt, because of such individual'~ race, color, religion ,
sex, or national origin:"
Clause 9 was adopted on .January 14, 1975, ser 121 Con~. Rec. 22,
approximatp)y six months aftrr petitionpr'~ discharge. In 1977 the House
Commi~sion on Administratiw Review (thr "ObE>y Commi~sion") termrd
"the anti-discrimination provisions of Rule XLIII ... all but unenforceable." Commission on Administrative Review, Recommendations and
Rationales Concrrning Administrative Units and Work Mana11:ement, 9.5th
Cong., 1st Sess., 5:3 (Comm. Print. 1977). The Commission recommended
tlw establishment of n Fair Employment Practice~ Panp) to provide ''Onbinding conciliation in cases of alleged violations of Clause 9. See H . R
Res . 766, 95th Cong., 1st S<•ss., § 504 (1977); Commission on Administrative ReviE-w, supm, at 52-53. This proposal was prevented from rearhing the House floor, however, when the Hou~e defeated the Rule whirh
would ha,·e governed consideration of the Obey Commission's resolution.
See 123 Con g. Hec. H10819-28 (Oct. 12, 1977).
On September 25, 1978, H. H. Re,: . 1380 was introduced railing for the
implementation of Clause 9 through the rreation of "a House FAir
Employment Relations BOlud, a House Fair Emnloyment H.elation~ 0ffirr.
and procedures for hearing and settliPg rompiRints alleging viol~tions of
Clnuse 9 of Hule XLIII . . . . " H . H Res. 1380. 95th Cone: .. 2d Bess.,
§ 2 ( 1978). H. H. Res. 1380 was referred to the Hou~e CommittPes on
Admini•trntion rmd Rules. where it ilpp:uently l:u,guished. Se~ 124 Cong.
Hec. H10697 (Sept. 25, 1978). The House fHiled to consider it before
adjournment.
There presently exists a "Oluntary House Fair Emnloyment Practices
Agreement. Members of the House who have signed the Agreement elect
n House Fair Employment Practices Committee, which has author.ity to
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We conclude, therefore, that she is an appropriate pa.rty to
invoke the general federal question jurisdiction of the District
Court to seek relief. She has a cause of action under the
Fifth Amendment. 21
Although petitioner has a cause of action. her complaint
might nevertheless be dismissed under Rule 12 (b) ( 6) unless
it can be determined that judicial relief is available. We
therefore proceed to consider whether a damages remedy is an
appropriate form of relief.

c

We approach this inquiry on the basis of established law.
"[I]t is ... well settled that where legal rights have been
invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to
sue for such invasion. federal courts may use any available
remedy to make good the wrong done." Bell v. Hood, supra.,
at 684. Bivens, supra, holds that in appropriate circumstances
a federal district court may provide relief in damages for the
violation of constitutional rights if there are "no special factors
counselling hesita.tion in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress." !d., at 396. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at-.
First, a damages remedy is surely appropriate in this case.
"Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary
remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty."
investigate cases of alleged discrimination among participating Members.
The Committee has no enforcement powers.
21 Five Courts of Appeals hnve implied cau~es of action directly under
the Fifth Amendment. Sec Apton v. Wilson, 165 U. S. App. D. C. 22,
506 F. 2d 83 (1974); Sullivan v. Mw·1Jhy. 156 U. S. App . D. C. 28, 478
F. 2d 938 (197:3) ; United States ex rel. Moon'. v. Koelzer, 457 F. 2d 892
(CA3 1972) ; Loe v. Armistead, 582 F. 2d 1291 (CA4 1978), eert. pending
sub nom. Moffit v. Loe, No. 78-1260; State Marine Lines. Iuc . v. Slttdtz,
498 F. 2d 1146 (CA4 1974): Green v. Ca1·lson, 581 F. 2d 669 (CA7 1978),
cert. pendiu!!:, No . 78-1261; Jacobson v. Tahoe Region@ Planning Agency,
566 F. 2d 1:353 (CA9 1977) , rever~ed in part and affirmed in purt on
other grounds sub nom. Lake Tahoe Country · Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe
(1979); Bennet v. Campbell, 564
Regional Planning Ageru;y,- U. S. F. 2d 329 (CA9 1977) •

.
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Bivens, supra, at 395. Relief in damages would be judicially
manageable, for the case presents a focused remedial issue
without difficult questions of valuation or causation. See id.,
at 409 (Harlan, J.. concurring in judgment). Litigation under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has given federal
courts great experience evaluating claims for backpay due to
illegal sex discrimination. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e- 5 (g).
Moreover, since respondent is no longer a Congressman, see
n. 1, supra, equitable relief in the form of reinstatement would
be unavailing. And there are available no other alternative
forms of relief. For Davis, as for Bivens, "it is damages or
nothing." 22 Bivens, supra, at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in
judgment).
Second, there are in this case "no special factors counselling
hesitation." "[F]ederal fiscal policy," for example, is not
implicated. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301,
311 (1947). And. although the defendant in this suit was, at
the time petitioner's complaint was filed . a United States
Congressman, we apply the principle that "legislators .. ..
ought generally to be bound by [the law] as are ordinary
persons." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615 (1972).
Cf. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 320 (1973). As Butz v.
Economou stated only last Term:
"Our system of jurisprudence rests on the assumption
22 Respondent does not dispute petitioner's claim that she "has no cause
of action nnd~.>r LouiHiana law." Brief for Petitioner 19. Sre 3 Empl.
Pra c. Guide (CCH) ,[ 23 ,541' (Ang. 19iR). And it is far from clear that
a stat e court would have authority to effect a damages remedy against a
United Stat<•s Congres~man for illegal actions in the course of his official
conduct, ~.>v en if a. plaintiff's claim w~.>re grounded in the United Sta tes
Constitution . See Ta1'ble's Ca..~ e, 1~ Wall . 397 (1871) . D eference t o
state court adjudication in a case sueh n;.; thi:; would in any event not serve
the purposes of f~.>drralh:im , since it involves the applica tion of the Fifth
Amendment to n f~.>d e ral officer in the rourse of his fedrral dntieR. It is
therefore particulHrly appropriate that a federal court be the forum ..in
which a damages remedy be awa.rdetl.
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that all individuals. whatf'ver their position in govern~
ment, are subject to fedf'rallaw:
"'No man in this country is so high that he is above the
law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance
with impunity. All officers of the govermnent from the
highest to the lowest are creatures of the law, and are
bound to obey it.'
"United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 220 (1882)." ~
U.S., at-.
Third. there is in this case "no explicit congressional declara~
tion that persons" in petitioner's position injured by unconstitutional federal f'mployment discrimination "may not recover
money damages from" those responsible for the injury.
Bivens, supra, at 397. (Emphasis supplied.) While such a
declaration would not necessarily be binding on this Court, it
would be a factor to consider in determining what relief is
appropriate. The Court of Appeals apparently interpreted
§ 717 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 86 Stat.
103, 42 U. S.C. § 2000e-16, as an explicit congressional prohibi~
tion against judicial remedies for those in petitioner's position.
When § 717 was added to Title VII to protect federal em~
ployees from discrimination. it failed to extend this protection
to congressional employees such as petitioner who are not in
the competitive service. 2 " See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16 (a).
There is no evidence, however, that Congress meant § 717 to
foreclose alternative remedies available to those not covered
by the statute. Such silence is far from "the clearly discernible will of Congress" perceived by the Court of Appeals. 571
F. 2d, at 800. And we are particularly loathe to read this
silence as a prohibition of all judicial relief for respondent's ala Since peti1 ioner wa.s not in thr competitive service, see n. 2 s·upra,
tlw remedial provi~ions of § 717 of Title VII arc not available to h('r. In
Bmwn v. Service~ Adrninistmtion, 425 U.S. 8:20 (1976), we held that the
remedie~ provided by § 717 arc exclusive for those federal employees
·covered by the statute.
2
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leged violation of petitioner's Fifth Amendment right, because,
so interpreted. ~ 717 would "practically ... deny the right."
Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451. 457 (1904). The "right would
be sacrificed or obliterated if it were without ... remedy .... "
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 207
( 1944). This interpretation of § 717 would raise serious questions concerning its constitutionality. See Brinkerhoff-Faris
Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 682 (1930); cf.
Johnson v. Robisoo, 415 U. S. 361, 366-367 (1974). In such
cases "it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question [s] may be
avoided." United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402
U. S. 363, 369 (1971). See National Labor Relations Board
v. Catholic Bishops of Chicago, - - U. S. - , (1979).
We therefore do not interpret § 717 to foreclose the availability of a damages remedy to those in petitioner's position.
Finally, the Court of Appeals appeared concerned that, if a
damages remedy were made available to petitioner, the danger
existed "of deluging the federal courts with claims ... .'r
571 F. 2d. at 800. We do not perceive the potential for such
a deluge. By virtue of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, a damages remedy
is already available to redress injuries such as petitioner's
when they occur under color of state law. Moreover. a plaintiff seeking a damages remedy under the Constitution must
first demonstrate that his constitutional rights have been
violated. We do not hold that every tort by a federal official
may be redressed in damages. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373'
U. S. 647 (1963). And, of course, were Congress to create
equally effective alternative remedies, the need for damages
relief might be obviated. See Bivens, supra, at 397. But
perhaps the most fundamental answer to the concerns expressed by the Court of Appeals is that provided by Justice
Harlan concurring in Biven:
"Judicial resotarces,. I a.r.t1 wen aware, are increasingly·
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scarce these days. Nonetheless. when we automatically
close the courthouse door solely on this basis. we implicitly express a value judgment on the comparative
importance of classes of legally protected interests. And
current limitations upon the effective functioning of the
courts arising from budgetary inadequacies should not be
permitted to stand in the way of the recognition of otherwise sound constitutional principles." 403 U. S., at 411.
We conclude. therefore, that in this case. as in Bivens, if
petitioner is able to prevail 011 the merits. she should be able
to redress her injury in damages, a "remedial mechanism
normally available in the federal courts." Bivens, supra, at
397.

III
We hold today that th0 Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. en bane, must be reversed because petitioner has a
cause of action under the Fifth Amendment. and because her
injury may be redressed by a damages remedy. The Court of
Appeals did not consider. however. whether respondent's conduct was shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause of the
Constitution. Accordingly. we do not reach this question.
And, of course. we express no opinion as to the merits of
petitioner's complaint.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

So ordered.
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BRENNAN, .JR.

23 April 1979

Re: No. 78-5072, Davis v. Passman
Dear John,
This is prompted by your observation at Friday's Conference
that Passman might be in tension with the rationale voted by a
major1ty as the basis for decision in Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
No. 78-680. I do not think this tension exists, and will
attempt to explain why.
The opinion in Hutchinson will make clear that it is
preferable to reach at the outset Speech or Debate Clause
issues. I agree with this conclusion, because a major purpose
of the Speech or Debate Clause, where applicable, is to shield
federal legislators with absolute immunity 11 not only from the
consequences of litigation's results, but also from the burden
of defending themselves ... Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82,
85 (1967).

In my proposed opinion in Passman, however, I in fact first
reach the Speech or Debate C1ause issue, at least to the extent
of concluding that Passman will not be shielded by the Clause
if Davis' job was so unrelated to the legislative process that
the institutional interests of the Congress as a coordinate
department would not be impaired by judicial review of
Passman's liability for the termination of her employment. Thus
Passman will not be immune if Davis' position were the
equivalent of that of a file clerk or messenger boy. The nature
of the position that Davis held under Passman, however, is not
established on the record before us. The District Court made no
findings concerning this question, since it dismissed Davis'
complaint on a 12 (b) (6) motion. The Fifth Circuit panel,
although it reached the Speech or Debate issue, did not discuss
the nature of Davis' employment, since it rested its holding on
the more general ground that 11 representatives are not immune
from inquiry into their decisions to dismiss staff members ...

544 F.2d, at 880. And, of course, the en bane opinion of the
Fifth Circuit did not even reach the Speech or Debate Clause
issue.
To decide whether Passman is shielded with immunity by the
Speech or Debate Clause, therefore, the case will have to be
remanded to the District Court for factual findings concerning
the nature of Davis' employment. Thus not only is the burden of
further litigation inevitable, but the cause of action question
must necessarily be reached, since such litigation could not
continue unless Davis' complaint stated a cause of action. In
these circumstances to hold that the prospective rationale of
Proxmire requires remanding the case to the Fifth Circuit for a
determination of the Speech or Debate Clause issue not only
would mean a waste of judicial resources, but also would have
the ironic result of placing on Passman even greater and
unnecessary burdens of litigation.
I would be happy to make this reasoning more explicit in
the proposed opinion, should that be thought necessary in light
of Proxmire.
Sincerely,
~
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W.J.B. Jr.
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Dear John,
This is prompted by your observation at Friday's Conference
that Passman might be in tension with the rationale voted by a
major1ty as the basis for decision in Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
No. 78-680. I do not think this tension exists, and will
attempt to explain why.
The opinion in Hutchinson will make clear that it is
preferable to reach at the outset Speech or Debate Clause
issues. I agree with this conclusion, because a major purpose
of the Speech or Debate Clause, where applicable, is to shield
federal legislators with absolute immunity 11 not only from the
consequences of litigation's results, but also from the burden
of defending themselves ... Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82,
85 (1967).

In my proposed opinion in Passman, however, I in fact first
reach the Speech or Debate Clause issue, at least to the extent
of concluding that Passman will not be shielded by the Clause
if Davis' job was so unrelated to the legislative process that
the institutional interests of the Congress as a coordinate
department would not be impaired by judicial review of
Passman's liability for the termination of her employment. Thus
Passman will not be immune if Davis' position were the
equivalent of that of a file clerk or messenger boy. The nature
of the position that Davis held under Passman, however, is not
established on the record before us. The District Court made no
findings concerning this question, since it dismissed Davis'
complaint on a 12 (b) (6) motion. The Fifth Circuit panel,
although it reached the Speech or Debate issue, did not discuss
the nature of Davis' employment, since it rested its holding on
the more general ground that 11 representatives are not immune
from inquiry into their decisions to dismiss staff members ...

544 F.2d, at 880. And, of course, the en bane opinion of the
Fifth Circuit did not even reach the Speech or Debate Clause
issue.
To decide whether Passman is shielded with immunity by the
Speech or Debate Clause, therefore, the case will have to be
remanded to the District Court for factual findings concerning
the nature of Davis' employment. Thus not only is the burden of
further litigation inevitable, but the cause of action question
must necessarily be reached, since such litigation could not
continue unless Davis' complaint stated a cause of action. In
these circumstances to hold that the prospective rationale of
Proxmire requires remanding the case to the Fifth Circuit for a
determination of the Speech or Debate Clause issue not only
would mean a waste of judicial resources, but also would have
the ironic result of placing on Passman even greater and
unnecessary burdens of litigation.
I would be happy to make this reasoning more explicit in
the proposed opinion, should that be thought necessary in light
of Proxmire.
Sincerely,
(,
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2 1 MAY 1979

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNIT!If~ : - - No. 78-5072
Shirley Davis, Petitioner, ! On Writ of Certiorari to the United
v~
States Court of Appeals for the
Otto E. Passman.
Fifth Circuit,
[Ma;v -, W79]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting,
Although I join the opinion of THE CHIEF JusTICE, I write
separately to emphasize that 110 prior decision of this Court
justifies today's intrusion upon the legitimate powers of
Members of Congress.
The Court's analysis starts with the general proposition that
"the judiciary is dearly discernible as the primary means
through which [colistitutionai] fights may be enforced," ante;
at 13. It leaps from this generalization, unexceptionable it•
self, to the conclusion that individuals who have suffered an
injury to a constitutionally protected interest, and who lack an
"effective" alternative. ''must be able to invoke the existing
jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable
constitutional rights." Jd., at 14 (emphasis supplied). Apart
from the dubious logic of this reasoning, I know of no precedent of this Court that supports such an absolute statement
of the federal judiciary's obiigation to entertain private suits
that Congress has not authorized. On the contrary, I have
thought it clear that federal courts must exercise a principled
discretion when called upon to infer a private cause of action
directly from the language of the Constitution. In the
present case, for reasons well summarized by THl'J CHIEF J us-"
TICE, principles of comity and separation of powers should
require a federal court to stay its hand.
. To be sure, it has been clear-at least since Bivens v. SiX
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971 )-that,
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in appropriate circumstances private causes of action may be
inferred from provisions of the Constitution. 1 But the exercise of this responsibility involves discretion, alld a weighing
of relevant concerns. As Mr. Justice Harlan observed in addressing this very point, a court should "take into account [a
range of policy considerations] at least as broad as the range
of those a legislature would consider with respect to an express
statutory authorization of a traditional remedy." Bivens,
supra, at 407.
Among those policies that a court certainly should consider
in deciding whether to imply a constitutional right of action is
that of comity toward an equal and coordinate branch of
government. 2 As Chief Justice Waite observed over a century
ago, "One branch of government cannot encroach on the
domain of another without danger. The safety of our institutions depends in no sma.U degree on a strict observance of this
salutary rule." Sinking Fund Cases, 9 Otto 700, 718 ( 1878).
A court necessarily has wider latitude in interpreting the Constitution
than it does in construing a statute, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 407 (1819). Moreover, the federal courts have a far greater responsibility under the Constitution for the protection of those rights derived
directly from it, than for the definition and enforcement of rights created
solely by Congress. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U. S. 388,407 (1971) (Harlan, .T., <'OIH'Urring) .
2 It is settled that where discretion exists, a variety of factors rooted in
the Constitution may lead a fedrral court to refuse to entertain an otherwise properly presented constitutional claim. See, e. g., Moore v. Sims,U.S.- (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v.
Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975);
Younger v. Han·is, 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern R. C'o., 341 U. S. 341 ( 1951); Douglas v. City of Jeannette,
319 U. S. 157 (1943); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943); Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941); Hawks v. Hamill,
288 U. S. 52 ( 1933). Traditionally the issue has arisen in the context of
a federal court's exercise of itR equity powers with re~pect to the States.
Concerns of comity similar to thoHe that govern our dealings with 1he
States should come into play when we are asked to mterfere with the
ftlnctioning of Congrrss.
1
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Even where the authority of one branch over a matter is not
exclusive, so that a federal court properly may accept jurisdiction over the dispute, we have recognized that the principle of
separation of powers continues to have force as a matter of
policy. For example, in Uniteif States v. Nixon, 418 U. S.
683 (1974), we held on the one hand that the question ·whether
the President had a claim of privilege as to conversations with
his advisers was an issue to be resolved by the judiciary, and
on the other hand that separation-of-powers considerations -required the recognition of a qualified privilege.
Whether or not the employment decisions of a Member of
Congress fall within the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause
of the Constitution, a question the Court does not reach today, 3
it is clear that these decisions are bound up with the conduct of
his duties. As THE CHIEF JusTICE observes, ante, a. Congressman necessarily relies heavily on his personal staff in discharging the duties of his office. Because of the nature of his
office, he must rely to an extraordinary extent on the loyalty
and compatibility of everyone who works for him. Cf. Elrod
v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 377-388 ( 1976) (PowELL, J., dissenting). A Congressman simply cannot perform his constitutiona-l duties effectively, or serve his constituents properly,
unless he is supported by a staff in which he has total
· confidence.
The foregoing would seem self-evident even if Congress had
not indicated an intention to reserve to its Members the right
to select, employ and discharge staff personnel without judicial
interference. But Congress unmistakably has made clear its
view on this subject. It took pains to exempt itself from the
coverage of Title VIV Unless the Court is abandoning or
3 As I would hold that peitioner does not have a cause of action against
respondent, I also would not reach tlw speech or debate i::;::;uf'.
1
Nor do I undf'r::;tand the 'Court':; statement that an express congressional prohibition of judicial review of these deci~ions "would not necessarily be binding on this Court." Ante, at 18. The Court repeatedly has
accepted, as a general principle, the power of Congress to place limitations
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modifying sub silentio our holding in Brown v. General Serv·
ices Administration, 425 U. S. 820 (1976), that Title VII as
amended "provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims
of discriminl:\-tion in federal employment," id., at 835, the
exemption from this statute for congressional employees should
bar all judicial relief.
In sum, the decision of the Court tod~y is not an exercise
of principled discretion. It avoids our obligation to take into
account the range of policy and constitutional considerations
that we would expect a legislature to ponder in determining
whether a particular remedy should be enacted. It fails to
weigh the legitimate interests of Members of Congress. In~
deed, the decision simply ignores the constitutional doctrine
of separl'l-tion of powers. In my view, the serious intrusion
upon ' the authority of Members of Congress to choose and control their own personal staffs cannot be justified. 5
on the jurisdiction of federal courts. See, e. g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319
U. S. 182 (1943); Lauf v. E. G. 8kinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323 (·1938);
Ex parte jl1cCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 440
(1850). For a defense of the exclusive power of Congress to define the
limits of federal jurisdiction, see Wechsler, The Oourts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1004-1008 (1965). Brinkerhoff-Faris
Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 682 (1930), cited by the Court
as support for the authority of a federal court to reject legislative limitations on its jurisdiction, is completely inapposite: The issue there involved
the power of a state legislature to limit the means of vindicating federal
rights. This is quite different from deciding which co-equal branch of the
Federal Government has the authority to determine how these rights may
be enforced.
·
5 The just ification the Court relies upon is the duty of federal courts
to vindicate constitutional rights-a duty no one disputes. But it never
has been thought that this duty required a blind exercise of judicial power
without regard to other interests or constitutional principles. Indeed, it
would not be surprising for Congres:; to consider today':; action unwarranted
and to exercise its authority to reassert the proper balance betweet~ the
legislative and judicial branches. If the reaction took the form of limiting
the jurisdiction of federal courts, the effect conceivably could be to frusi;rate the vindication of rights properly protected by the Court.
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MR. JusTICE P~~<~ ~~. ~·ith w!~
l MR. JusTICE REHNQUIS'l' \
joins, dissenting. (~YIIU... (!..,. •
Although I join the opinion f HE CHIEF JusTICE, I write
separately to emphasize that no prior decision of this Court
justifies today's intrusion upon the legitimate powers of
Members of Congress.
The Court's analysis starts with the general proposition that
"the judiciary is clear1y discernible as the primary mean~
through which [constitutional] rights may be enforced," ante,
at 13. It leaps from this generalization, unexceptionable itself, to the conclusion that individuals who have suffered an
injury to a constitutionally protected interest, and who lack an
11
effective" alternative, "must be able to invoke the existing
jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable
constitutional rights." ld., at 14 (emphasis supplied). Apart
from the dubious logic of this reasoning, I know of no precedent of this Court that supports such an absolute statement
of the federal judicia..ry's obligation to entertain private suits
that Congress has not authorized. On the contrary, I have
thought it clear that federal courts must exercise a principled
discretion when called upon to infer a private cause of action
directly from the language of the Constitution. In the
present case, for reasons well summarized by THE CHIEF JusTICE, principles of comity and separation of powers should
require .a federal court to stay its hand.
To be sure, it has been clear- at least since Bivens v. Six:
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971)-that

l
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in appropriate circumstances private ca.uses of action may be
inferred from provisions of the Constitution. 1 But the exer..
cise of this responsibility involves discretion, and a weighing
of relevant concerns. As Mr. Justice Harlan observed in addressing this very point, a court should "take into account [a
range of policy considerations] at least as broad as the range
of those a legislature would consider with respect to an express
statutory authorization of a traditiona.l remedy." Bivens,
supra, at 407.
Among those policies that a court certainly should considet
in deciding whether to imply a constitutional tight of action is
that of comity toward an equal and coordinate branch of
government. 2 As Chief Justice Waite observed over a century
1 A court necessarily has wider latitude in interpreting the Constitution
than it does in construing a statute, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 407 (1819). Moreover, the federal courts have a far greater responsibility under the Constitution for 1he protection of those rights derived
directly from it, than for the definition and enforcement of rights created
solely by Congress. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 40~
U.S. 388,407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
2 It is settled that where discretion exists, a variety of factors rooted in
the Constitution may lead a federal court to refuse to entertain an otherwise properly presented constitutional claim. See, e. g., Moore v. Sims,U. S. (1979); Tminor v. Hernandez, 431 U. S. 434 (1977); Juidice v.
Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Huffman v. Pur-sue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975);
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern R. Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Douglas v. City of Jeannette,
319 U. S. 157 (1943); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943); Rail•
road Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Hawks v. Hamill,
288 U. S. 52 ( 1933). Traditionally the issue has arisen in the context of
a federal court's exercise of its equity powers with respect to the States.
Concerns of comity similar to those that govern our dealings with the
States should come into play when we are asked to interfere with the
functioning of Congress.
The Court ~uggests that because the Speech or Debate Clau:::e of th~
Constitution embodiet> a separatwn-of-powert> principle, the Corstitution
afford~ no further protection to the prerogatives of Members of Congress.
Ante, at 17. This assertion not only marks a striking departure from
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ago, "One branch of government cannot encroach on the
domain of another without danger. The safety of our institutions depends in no small degree 'on a strict observance of this
salutary rule." Sinking Fund Cases, 9 Otto 700, 718 (1878).
Even where the authority of one branch over a matter is not
exclusive, so that a federal court properly may accept jurisdiction over the dispute, we have recognized that the principle of
separation of powers continues to have force as a matter of
policy. For example, in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S.
683 (1974), we held on the one hand that the question whether
the President had a claim of privilege as to conversations with
his advisers was an issue to be resolved by the judiciary, and
on the other hand that separation-of-powers considerations required the recognition of a qualified privilege.
Whether or not the employment decisions of a Member of
Congress fall within the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause
of the Constitution, a question the Court does not reach today, 3
it is clear that these decisions are bound up with the conduct of
his duties. As THE CHIEF JusTICE observes, ante, a Congressman necessarily relies heavily on his personal staff in discharging the duties of his office. Because of the nature of his
office, he must rely to an extraordinary extent on the loyalty
and compatibility of everyone who works for him. Cf. Elrod
v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 377-388 ( 1976) (PowELL, J., dissenting). A Congressman simply cannot perform his constitu-

.,...

ptecedent, but also constitutes a nofuequitur. Our com;titutional structure of government. rests on a variety of checks and balances; the u·~mef!
of one such check doPs not negate all others.
3 It is quitP doubtful whether the Court should not consider respondent's
Speech or Debate Clau~e claim as a threshold i~Rue. The purpose of that
Clause, when it applies, includeti the protection of Members of Congress
from the harassment. of litigation. Since the Court chooses not to consider
this claim, and addresses only the cause of action issue, I limit my dissent
accordingly. In doing so, I imply no view a;; to the merits of the speech
()r debate issue or to the propriety of not addressing the claim before all
other issues.
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tiona.l duties effectively, or serve his constituents properly,
unless he is supported by a staff in which he has total
confidence.
The foregoing would seem self-evident even if Congress had
not indicated an intention to reserve to its Members the right
to select, employ and discharge staff personnel without judicial
interference. But Congress unmistakably has made clear its
view on this subject. It took pains to exempt itself from the
coverage of Title VII. Unless the Court is abandoning or
modifying sub silentio our holding in Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U. S. 820 (1976), that Title VII as
amended "provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims
of discrimination in federal employment," id., at 835, the
exemption from this statute for congressional employees should
bar all judicial relief.
In sum, the decision of the Court today is not an exercise
of principled discretion. It avoids our obligation to take into
account the range of policy and constitutional considerations
that we would expect a legislature to ponder in determining
whether a particular remedy should be enacted. It fails to
weigh the legitimate interests of Members of Congress. In-deed, the decision simply ignores the constitutional doctrine
of separation of powers. In my view, the serious intrusion
upon the authority of Members of Congress to choose and control their own personal staffs cannot be justified.•
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
• Th(' justification the Court r('lies upon 1s the duty of federal courts
to vindicate constitutional rights-a duty no one disputes. But it never
has been thought that this duty required a blind exercise of judicial power
without regard to other interests or constitutional principles. Indeed, it
would not be surprising for Congress to consider today's action unwarranted
and to exercise its authority to reassert the proper balance between the
legislative and judicial branches. If the reaction took the form of limiting
the jurisdiction of federal courts, the effect conceivably could be to frustrate the vindication of rights properly protected by the Court.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL. with whom MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST
joins, dissenting.
Although I join the opinion of THE CHIEF JusTICE, I write
separately to emphasize that no prior decision of this Court
justifies today's intrusion upon the legitimate powers of
Members of Congress.
The Court's analysis starts with the general proposition that
"the judiciary is clearly discernible as the primary means
through which [constitutional] rights may be enforced," ante,
at 13. It leaps from this generalization, unexceptionable itself, to the conclusion that individuals who have suffered an
injury to a constitutionally protected interest, and who lack an
11
effective" alternative, "must be able to invoke the existing
jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable
constitutional rights.)' ld., at 14 (emphasis supplied). Apart
from the dubious logic of this reasoning, I know of no precedent of this Court that supports such an absolute statement
of the federal judiciary's obligation to entertain private suits
that Congress has not authorized. On the contrary, I have
thought it clear that federal courts must exercise a principled
discretion when called upon to infer a private cause of action
directly from the language of the Constitution. In the
present case, for reasons well summarized by THE CHIEF JusTICE, principles of comity and separation of powers should
require a federal court to stay its hand.
To be sure, it has been clear-at least since Bivens v. Si:t
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971)-that
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in appropriate circumstances private causes of action may be
inferred from provisions of the Constitution.1 But the exer ..
cise of this responsibility involves discretion, and a weighing
of relevant concerns. As Mr. Justice Harlan observed in addressing this very point, a court should "take into account [a
range of policy considerations] at least as broad as the range
of those a legislature would consider with respect to an express
statutory authorization of a traditional remedy." Bivens,
supra, at 407.
Among those policies that a court certainly should considet
in deciding whether to imply a constitutional right of action is
that of comity toward an equal and coordinate branch oi
government. 2 As Chief Justice Waite observed over a century
1 A court necessarily has wider latitude in interpreting the Constitution
than it does in construing a statute, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 407 (1819). Moreover, the federal courts have a far greater responsibility under the Constitution for the protection of those rights derived
directly from it, than for the definition and enforcement of rights created
solely by Congress. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 40S
U.S. 388,407 (1971) (Harlan, J ., concurring).
2 It is settled that where di~cretion exists, a variety of factors rooted in
the Constitution may lead a federal court to refuse to entertain an otherwise properly presented co~titutional claim. See, e. g., Moore v. Sims,U. S. (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U. S. 434 (1977); Juidice v.
Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); H·uffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975);
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (i971); Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern R. Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Douglas v. City of Jeannette,
319 U. S. 157 (1943); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943); Rail"
road Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Hawks v. Hamill,
288 U. S. 52 (1933). Traditionally the issue has arisen in the context of
a federal court's exercise of its equity powers with respect to the States.
Concerns of comity similar to those that govern our dealings with the
States should come into play when we are asked to interfere with the
functioning of Congress.
The Court suggests that because the Speech or Debate Clause of the
Constitution embodies a :;pparatwn-of-powen; principle, the Corstitution
afford:; no furthpr protection to thP prerogatives of Members of Congress.
Ante, at 17. This assertion not only marks a striking departure fran~
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ago, "One branch of government cannot encroach on the
domain of another without danger. The safety of our institutions depends in no small degree 'on a strict observance of this
salutary rule." Sinking Fund Cases, 9 Otto 700, 718 (1878).
Even where the authority of one branch over a matter is not
exclusive, so that a federal court properly may accept jurisdiction over the dispute, we have recognized that the principle of
separation of powers continues to have force as a matter of
policy. For example, in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S.
683 (1974), we held on the one hand that the question whether
the President had a claim of privilege as to conversations with
his advisers was an issue to be resolved by the judiciary, and
on the other hand that separation-of-powers considerations required the recognition of a qualified privilege.
Whether or not the employment decisions of a Member of
Congress fall within the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause
of the Constitution, a question the Court does not reach today, 3
it is clear that these decisions are bound up with the conduct of
his duties. As THE CHIEF JusTICE observes, ante, a Congressman necessarily relies heavily on his personal staff in discharging the duties of his office. Because of the nature of his
office, he must rely to an extraordinary extent on the loyalty
and compatibility of everyone who works for him. Cf. Elrod
v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 377-388 (1976) (PowELL, J., dissenting). A Congressman simply cannot perform his constitu..... ~

ptecedent, but also constitutes a nonseqmtur . Our constitutional
lure of government rests on a variety of checks and balances; the if.~'M'I''
of one such check does not negate all others.
3 It is quite doubtful whether the Court should not consider respondent's
Speech or Debate Chm~e claim as a threshold i~sue. The purpose of that
Clause, when it applies, includes the protection of Members of Congress
from the harassment of litigation. Since the Court chooses not to consider
this claim, and addm;ses only the cause of action issue, I limit my dissent
accordingly. In doing so, I imply no view as to the merits of the speech
(}r debate issue or to the propriety of not addressing the claun before all
other issues.
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tiona! duties effectively, or serve his constituents properly,
unless he is supported by a staff in which he has total
confidence.
The foregoing would seem self-evident even if Congress had
not indicated an intention to reserve to its Members the right
to select, employ and discharge staff personnel without judicial
interference. But Congress unmistakably has made clear its
view on this subject. It took pains to exempt itself from the
. S) j 0 N
coverage of Title VII. Unless the Court is abandoning or 10 ~ 1
modifying sub silentio our holding in Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820 (1976), that Title VII as
amended "provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims
of discrimination in federal employment," id., at 835, the
exemption from this statute for congressional employees should
bar all judicial relief.
In sum, the decision of the Court today is not an exercise
of principled discretion. It avoids our obligation to take into
account the range of policy and constitutional considerations
that we would expect a legislature to ponder in determining
whether a particular remedy should be enacted. It fails to
weigh the legitimate interests of Members of Congress. In'Cl.eed, the decision simply ignores the constitutional doctrine
of separation of powers. In my view, the serious intrusion
upon the authority of Members of Congress to choose and control their own personal staffs cannot be justified. 4
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
4
The justification the Court relies upon is the duty of federal courts
to vindicate constitutiOnal rights-a duty no one disputes. But it never
has been thought that this duty required a blind exercise of judicial power
without regard to other intert>sts or constitutional principles. Indeed, it
would not be surpnsing for Congress to cons1der today's action unwarranted
and to exercise its authority to reassert the proper balance between the
legislative and judicial branches. If tlw reaction took the form of limiting
the jurisdiction of federal courts, the effect conceivably could be to frustrate the vindication of rights properly protected by the Court.
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78-5072 Davis v. Passman
Dissent from the Bench

I exercise the privilege we have - though rarely

/
Q

usee' - to dissent orally.

This is a uniquely important case

to the proper functioning of our system of government.

The

question, in essence, is whether one branch of government may
deprive the constitutional officers of another branch of the
power to choose their own .meet

ee-ni~staff

members.

The petitioner was employed by respondent Passman,
then a member of Congress, as his Deputy Administrative
Assistant.

'Z

•

.J stated

Passman lperhaps with improvident candor

that because of the "unusually heavy workload" and the
"diversity" of the position, he preferred to have a man
rather than a woman as his Administrative Assistant.
Petitioner sued the Congressman for damages, claiming a
violation of the Equal Protection component of the Due
Process Clause.

No statute authorizes a suit of this kind.

Indeed, Congress refrained from including itself under Title
VII .

The question is whether a right to sue may be inferred

from the Constitution itself.
in the affirmative.

The Court today answers this

2.

_Y

//_____

I

I

The Court did reserve judgment as to whether the ...

Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution forbids such a

I

suit against a Congressman.

\I

only to "a speech or debate in either house".

I

By its terms, the Clause applies
But however

"'-,

)

1

the question as to its applicability may be decided, the

~-~u_d_:ment today will remain in effect.
Th.t.

branch.

Hi-s

rationale'fcannot be limited to the legislative

cA

-t ~· s

d...t. c 1.!. ;c.N'\

It appears to extend equally to the executive and

judicial branches.

If staff members of a Congressman are

free to sue for damages upon termination of services, members
of the personal staff of a President or a federal judge would
seem to have a like cause of action.
The Court's decision, in my view, contravenes basic
principles that underlie the separation of powers doctrine.
More than 100 years ago Chief Justice Waite observed that
"one branch of government cannot encroach on the domain of
another without danger • • • to our institutions."

:

J.

r

~' '•

3.

----.

- • Whether it be the President, a member of Congress
r she will

or a

l

/

~forme~g/"constituti

~

or she i

suppo~d by a personal - satisfactory staff in each member of

\~ wb~ ther~

is total confidence.

I have no reason to believe that discrimination, in
hiring or firing, is practiced by members of Congress.
Questions of discrimination involve subtle issues of fact and
intent.

They

~

must be resolved by a lawsuit.

If

senior officials of government live under the threat of
damage suits

by disappointed job applicants, or by employees

discharged or not promoted, such officials no longer will be
free to control their own personal staffs.
There is no precedent in our prior decisions for
this serious intrusion by courts upon the functioning at the
highest levels of the separate branches of government.
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78-5072 Davis v. Passman
Dissent from the Bench

I exercise the privilege we have - though rarely
used - to dissent orally.

This is a uniquely important case

to the proper functioning of our system of government.

The

question, in essence~ is whether one branch of government may
deprive the constitutional officers of another branch of the
power to choose their own most senior staff members.
The petitioner was employed by respondent Passman,
then a member of Congress, as his Deputy Administrative
Assistant.
Passman, perhaps with improvident candor, stated
that because of the "unusually heavy workload" and the
"diversity" of the position, he preferred to have a man
rather than a woman as his Administrative Assistant.
Petitioner sued the Congressman for damages, claiming a
violation of the Equal Protection component of the Due
Process Clause.

No statute authorizes a suit of this kind.

Indeed, Congress refrained from including itself under Title
VII.

The question is whether a right to sue may be inferred

from the Constitution itself.
in the affirmative.

The Court today answers this

2.

The Court did reserve judgment as to whether the
Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution forbids such a
suit against a Congressman.

By its terms, the Clause applies

only to "a speech or debate in either house".

But however

the question as to its applicability may be decided, the
judgment today will remain in effect.
Its rationale cannot be limited to the legislative
branch.

It appears to extend equally to the executive and

judicial branches.

If staff members of a Congressman are

free to sue for damages upon termination of services, members
of the personal staff of a President or a federal judge would
seem to have a like cause of action.
The Court's decision, in my view, contravenes basic
principles that underlie the separation of powers doctrine.
More than 100 years ago Chief Justice Waite observed that
"one branch of government cannot encroach on the domain of
another without danger • • • to our institutions."

3.

Whether it be the President, a member of Congress
or a federal judge, he or she will be handicapped in
performning constitutional duties unless he or she is
supported by a personall satisfactory staff in each member of
which there is total confidence.
I have no reason to believe that discrimination, in
hiring or firing, is practiced by members of Congress.
Questions of discrimination involve subtle issues of fact and
intent.

They usually must be resolved by a lawsuit.

If

senior officials of government live under the threat of
damage suits

by disappointed job applicants, or by employees

discharged or not promoted, such officials no longer will be
free to control their own personal staffs.
There is no precedent in our prior decisions for
this serious intrusion by courts upon the functioning at the
highest levels of the separate branches of government.
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Dissent from the Bench

privilege we have - though rarely use to dissent orally

This is a uniquely important

proper functioning;lc f our system of government.

cas~o

the

The question, in

essence, is whether one branch of government~may deprive the
constitutional officers of another
their

~mbers.

branch~of the power to choose

~

The petitioner was employed by respondent Passman, then
a member of Congress, as his Deputy Administrative Assistant.

~~P~~~~~ #<~~~

PassmanA s~ because of the "unusually heavy

workload"/ and the "diversity" of the position ,; he preferred to
have a man rather than a woman as his Administrative Assistant.

)q

Petitioner sued the Congressman for damages, claiming a violation
of the Equal Protection component of the Due Process Clause.
statute authorizes a suit of this kind.

Indeed, Congress

refrained from including itself under Title VII.
whether a right to
itself.

su~may

/.t No

The question/ is

be inferred from the Constitution

The Court today answers this in the affirmative.

The rationale of this decision~ annot be limit~d to the
legislative branch.

It appears to extend equally to the executive

and judicial branches.

If staff members of

~ Congressman/are

free

to bring suits of this kind/ for damages, / members of the personal
staff of a P ~ ent )~r a federal judg y would seem to have a like
cause of action.
The Court's decision, in my view, contravenes basic
principles; ihat underlie the separation of powers doctrine.

More

than 100 years ago/ chief Justice Waite observeo/that "one branch
of government cannot encroach/ on the domain of anothe; lwithout
danger • . • to our institutions."

~~·lA.-~~

I have no reason to believe that discrimination, in

~..

hiring, promoting or firing, is practiced by members of Congress.

~~uestions
intent.

of discrimination; 'involve subtle issues of fact/ and

--

They often must be resolved by a lawsuit.
If senior officials of government / live under the threat

of damage suits

~by

disappointed job a e plicants, j or by
~

~~es

discharge~or ~t promoted, ~such officials no longer will be free
to

contro~their ~n p~son~l s ~ .
There is no precedent in our prior cases for this

serious intrusion by courts;Gpon the functioning jfat the highest
levels/ of the separate branches of government.
dissent from today's far-reaching decison.

Accordingly, I

til

.<
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MEMORANDUM TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:

Mr. Justice Powell

Paul
Davis v. Passman, No. 78-5072
April 30, 1979

Mr. Justice Powell, dissenting.
The Court today leaps from the general proposition that
"the judiciary is clearly discernible as the primary means
through which [constitutional] rights may be enforced," ante at
13, to the specific declaration that individuals who have
~

~vvl vJ"-0 f:l(~
vV ,\11\i!Vi

suffered an injury to a constitutionally protected interes ?~

cw,.,

? \ ~(Wy\1'-h...e
\V\e.'C'>VIS

o(

"must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts

red a ,.,,

for the protection of their justiciable constitutional rights."
Id. at 14 (emphasis supplied).
C'~<~ 1~ (o-..~a.vy>
t k.. ~~\ C.4wh

t

~

'Fowl-. I

.f'....t

-\'ki.,

<;IIWI'M~

..

~~t~
Ott-

statement of the federal judiciary's obligation to entertain

e.J(VfC.\C,C-

~'""V.
Jy~

I cannot accept such an absolute

C> \\,u;\

11'\tM

pm~\e

vrOV'\

a
C&V'r.(...

private suits that Congress has not e~pressly authori f ed.
1...... r.~-~<-•r~t-'> (.)f' .........do,
-tl ~ · .
1:...~ ¥~1 ('~+ i

u

-

C'

{ Do(vyf\iL

f

In 14 ~,.,\
11~r ~,. .
I
~Hill

pal!'e{ etlle.r. i I believe that oouAt8t a-iHn9 f-actors )3£eaen<o R=a-

~ ~~

tf

C\t.'~ 0¥\ ~ tfet t\1

&"""' ~ 1~5.~f
J \~,..._ CIM~t""tvh~ '.

:lk•~

require a federal court to stay its hand.

w~Y.C'J

~so·"'S
I have stated elsewhere my objections in principle to

I<;\~\vtO'(y

J

the creation of privatel causes of action by federal courts, a
process that permits the judiciary to arrogate to itself the

2.

power to resolve designated disputes in contravention of the
constitutional obligation of Congress to make such decisions.

I

u.s.

See Cannon v. University of · Chicago,
(Powell, J., dissenting).

(1979)

I concede that the implication of

private actions from the provisions of the Constitution presents
a different problem.

Id. , at

I

T e process of

n. 3.

~

constitutional interpretation necessarily involves greater
latitude on the part of a court than the construction of a

/
statute.(

McCulloch v. Marylc;md, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819).

Moreover, the federal courts have a far greater responsibility
under the Constitution for the protection of those rights
derived directly from it, than for the definition and
enforcement of rights created solely by Congress.

Bivens v. Six

I

Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403

J., concurring).

u.s.

388, 407 (1971)

(Harlan,

In exercising this latitude and meeting this

responsibility, we may be required in certain circumstances to
permit resort to the federal courts for private enforcement of
these rights.

It should not be forgotten, however, that the

implication of private action for constitutional violations
constitutes an exercise of principled discretion, and "that the
range of policy considera ions we may take into account is at
least as broad as the range of those a legislature would
consider with respect to an express statutory authorization of a

I
traditional remedy."

Id.

3.

Among those policies which a court

~~should

consider in deciding whether to imply a constitutional right of
action is that of comity toward an equal and coordinate branch

Waite ~ observed

of governme nt.

As Chief Justice

century ago, '#

e branch of government cannot encroach on the

domain of another without danger.

over a

The safety of our

institutions depends in no small degree on a strict observance
of this salutary rule."
(1878).

I

Sinking Fund Cases, 9 Otto 700, 718

Even where the authority of one branch over a matter is

not exclusive, so that a federal court properly may accept
jurisdiction over the dispute, we have recognized that the
principle of separation of powers continues to have force as a
v

matter of policy.

For example, in United States v. Nixon, 418

U.S. 683 (1974), we held on the one hand that the question
whether the President had a claim of privilege as to
conversations with his advisers was an issue to be resolved by
the judiciary, and on the other hand that separation-of-powers
considerations required . the recognition of a qualified
privilege.

A similar approach should govern here.

Whe ther or not the employment decisions of a member of
Congress fall within the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause of
the Constitution, it is clear that these matters are bound up

A .;

c'

~

)

d

I)

with the conduct of his duties ~p{ congressffian necessarily

4.

relies on his personal staff in carrying out his work.

Because

of the nature of his office, he must rely to an extraordinary
extent on the loyalty and compatibility of everyone who works
j
Cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 377-388 (1976)

for him.

(Powell, J., dissenting).

Any degree of judicial interference

with the process through which these positions are filled will
be disruptive as well as engender resentment and hostility on
the part of Conqress.
Furthermore, the best evidence we have indicates that
Congress does not wish to permit
decisions.

judic~l

review of its hiring

Unlike the Court, I cannot brush aside the clear

inference to be drawn from the decision of Congress to exempt
itself from the coverage of Title VII.
fN

~~~

..

\y c~U,'o

2..

Unless the Court is

abandoning Lour holding in Brown v. General Services

l TO)_,

j

Administration, 425 U.S. 820, that Title VII as amended
r~\ : J., ~~~ a.

r~;l"

\)4-

l fl-..4-

(

"provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of

[

discrimination in federal employment," id. , at 8 3 5, the

rli~ ~brot-4

~~~~~

--

(• 1$.-ovM t

exemption from this statute for congressional employees should
bar all judicial relief.
In sum, the decision of the Court today frustrates
principles of inter-branch cooperation that should guide the
exercise of our discretion to imply constitutional causes of
actions.

In so doing, the Court ignores a clear/

and in -my v~

5.
~indin~ expression
kind.

~ l<> yuW:,\'
J
of legislative inten ~ suits of this

This course inevitably will lead to conflict between

Congress and the judiciary, which in turn can only undermine the
position of the federal courts as the primary means of
vindicating constitutional interests in the face of popular
attack.

I cannot condone this use of the federal courts, and

therefore dissent.
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1.

It no longer is controversial that where discretion

exists, a variety of factors rooted in the Constitution may lead
a federal court to refuse to entertain an otherwise properly
~

presented

constitutional claim.

See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, --

J

u.s.

(1979):

Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977):

J

Juidice v. Vail, 430

u.s.

327 (1977):

Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,

I
420 U.S. 592 {1975):

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S 37 (1971):

..;
Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern R. Co., 341 U.S.

J
341

(1951):

Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943):
j

Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943):

Railroad

I
Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941):

Hawks v.

j

u.s.

Hamill, 288

52 (1933).

t

Althoug~ ~ raditionally

the issue

has arisen in the context of a federal court's exercise of its
~'"'-~

equity

rec.r c\ 1u s\~t( rowtc\tll~·

J

powersf~~hese ~rs

are pr:esent here to an equal i

O~ C,t.J\'\o\\ty ~~t ~~'V\ eN( ~4-I1W13 WI~
s r~\v.> ~te.s~u,\y C.\tV'M- '"'\-D p\~y IIJ~ ~ ~ c.t\~ vr"""
\ ~lruk W\~ -tw.... ww\c.'"'S oF cj~~.
?OWJL C.Ol'\{b"r\!>

degree
2.

Nor do I understand the Court's statement that an

express congressional prohibition of judicial review of these
decisions "would not necessarily be binding on this Court."
Ante, at 18.

1---we-lakl na-v-e- thouqht that- -the power-o f - C-ongress

1

to~

..

\ k C~t ~-r·:e\e..t\~ ~ c.c."'f~ ~ puwu- o~ (~~H
~ f\~ ~·-- \,~t.~ ~ ~ j"""\c.dt<-'h\1\-\ 0~ ~_)
[

Co-W~O

rJr- it

FN2.

of-fe<l~euclo-s-wa.s

the ;tldsdtetion

doubt,

Certainly-me~ -deeis±ous

established be¥Ond j

ha11e aecepted t-his {

I
.p.FO-po-si Lion as

rue

See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S.

/
182

(1943)~

Lauf v.

E~G.

Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323

I

I

Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506
440 (1850).

(1938)~

(186 9 )~

Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How.

For a persuasive defense of the exclusive power of

Congress to define the limits of federal jurisdictio~~ perha~

~oremost~ntemporary scholar in ~e are ~ see Wechsler, The
Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1004-1008
(1965).

~
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S.

673, 682 (1930), cited by the Court as support for the authority
of a federal court to reject legislative limitations on its
jurisdiction, is completely inapposite:

The issue there

involved the power of a state legislature to limit the means of
vindicating federal rights.

This is quite different from

deciding which co-equal branch of the federal government has the
authority to determine how these rights may be enforced.
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1.

It no

lGn~s~

is

~~

~rove~si~

that where discretion

"
exists, a variety of factors rooted in the Constitution may lead
a federal court to refuse to entertain an· otherwise properly
presented constitutional claim.

u.s.

(1979);

See, e.g., Moore v. Sims,

Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977);

Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977);
420 U.S. 592 (1975);

Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S 37 (1971);

Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern R. Co., 341 U.S.
341 (1951);

Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943);

Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943);

Railroad

Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941);
Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933).

Hawks v.

Traditionally the issue has arisen

in the context of a federal court's exercise of its equity

fu Stcitsu .
powers with respect to

~aee

prace~Jn~.

The same concerns of

comity that govern our dealings with the States
com~

~
~esa~y

into play when we are asked to interfere with

~~

the ~werkin~s

of Congress.
2.

Nor do I understand the Court's statement that an

express congressional prohibition of judicial review of these

FN2.
decisions "would not necessarily be binding on this Court."
Ante, at 18.

.)aA-.1~~~)

The Court repeatedly has ac ~pted the power of

"

Congress to place limitations on the jurisdiction of federal
courts.
Lauf
r - v.

See,~,

Lockerty v. Phillips, 319

E.G. Shinner & Co.,
...__ 303

McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869);
(1850).

For a

~~~aai~e

u.s.

u.s.

323 (1938);

182 (1943);
_Exparte

Sheldon v. _..._
Sill, 8 How. 440

defense of the exclusive power of

Congress to define the limits of federal jurisdiction, see
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev.
1001, 1004-1008 (1965).

Brinker~off-Faris I~ust

& §!vings Co.

v. H!ll, 281 U.S. 673, 682 (1930), cited by the Court as support
for the authority of a federal court to reject legislative
limitations on its jurisdiction, is completely inapposite:

The

issue there involved the power of a state legislature to limit
the means of vindicating federal rights.

This is quite

different from deciding which co-equal branch of the federal
government has the authority to determine how these rights may
be enforced.
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~

-

STAT~ -~~

~~~u-~

~ ..-.c.e16c~~<.

Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the tr( A-<-~
v.
United States Court of Appeals ~ /--'""~
Otto E. Passman.
for the Fifth Circuit.
a.. d...j.. _~

2J
rD

[April -, 1979]

MR.

-~s~~.

delivered the opinion of the Court. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 tJ. S. 388 (1971), held that a "cause of
action for damages" arises under the Constitution when
Fourth Amendment rights are violated. The issue presented
for decision in this case is whether a cause of action and a
damages remedy can also be implied directly under the Constitution when the Du~ Cla~e of the Fifth Amendment is violated. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
en bane, concluded that "no civil action for damages" can be
thus implied. 571 F. 2d 793, 801 (1978). We granted cer_tiorari,- U.S.- (1978), and we now reverse.
JusTICE BRENNAN

I
At the time this case commenced. respondent Otto E.
·Passman was a United States Cougressman from the Fifth
Congressional District of Louisiana. 1 On February 1. 1974,
Passman hired petitioner Shirley Davis as a deputy administrative assistant. ~ Passman subsequently terminated her
Passman was drft'ated in the 1976 primary election, and hi;; tenure in
cffice ended January :3 , Hl77.
2 In her complaint. Davi ~ :1ver~ that her ":salary was Sl8,000.00 per yea.r
with thr rxpecta t ion of n promotion to defendn nt'~ uclminist rn t i\·e a::;::;istnnt
at a salary of 832,000.00 prr year upon . the imminrnt retirement o(
dcfend:mt':s current ndmini;;trative a,.:si:shmt." App. , n1 4.
Davis was not hirrcl through the competitive service. Srr. 2 U. S. C.
§ 92.
1

.

J~/C
I
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employment, effective July 31, 1974, writing Davis that,
although she was an "able. energetic and a very hard worker,"
he had concluded "that it was essential that the understudy to
my Administrative Assistant be a man." 3 App., at 6.
Davis brought suit in the United States District Court .for
the Western District of Louisiana, alleging that Passman's
8

The full test of Passman's letter is as follows:
"Dear Mrs. Davis:
"My Washington staff joins me in saying that we miss you very much.
But, in ali probability, inwardly they all agree that I was doing you an
injustice by asking you to assume a responsibility that was so trying and
so hard that it would have taken all of the pleasure out of your work,
I must be completely fair with you, so please note the following:
· "You are able, energetic and a very hard worker. Certainly you command the respect of those. with whom you work; however, on account of
the unusually heavy work load in my Washington Office, and the diversity
of the job, I concluded that it was essential that the understudy to my
Administrative Assistant be a man. · I believe you ·will agree with this
conclusion.
"It would be unfair to yoti for me to · ask you to waste your talent
and experience in my. Monroe office because of the low salary that is
available because of a junior position. · Therefore, and so that your
experience and talent may be used to' advantage in some organization in
need of an extremely capable ~ecretary, I desire that you be continued
on the payroll at your present salary through July 31, 1974. This arrangement gives you your full year's vacation of one month, plus one additional
month. May. I further say that the work load in the Monroe office is
very limited, and since you would come in as a junior member of the
staff at such a low salary, it would actual!)· be an offen~e to you.
"I know that secretaries -with your ability are very much in ·demand in
Monroe. If an additional letter of recommendation from me would be
advantageous to you, do not hesitate to let me know. Again, assuring you
that my Washington staff and your humble Congressllliln feel that the
contribution you made to our Washington office has· helped all of us.
"With best wishes,
Sincerely,
js/ Otto E. Passman
OTTO E. ·PASSl\IAN
Member ·of Congress."'
App., at 6-=-7,

I

I

I
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conduct discriminated against her "on the basis of sex in
violation of the United States Constitution and the Fifth
Amendment thereto." /d., at 4. Davis sought damages in
the form of backpay. /d., at 5! Jurisdiction for her suit was
founded on 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a), which provides in pertinent part that federal "district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in conttoversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000
___........,. . . . and arises
under the Constitution ... of the United States .... "
Passman moved to dismiss Davis' action for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
12 (b)( 6), arguing, inter alia, that "the law affords no private
right of action" for her claim. 5 App. , at 8. The District
Court accepted this argument, ruling that Davis had "no
private right of action." /d. , at 9. 6 A p.anel of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 544 F. 2d 865 (1977).
The panel concluded that a cause of action for damages arose
directly under the Fifth Amendment; that, taking as true the
allegations in Davis' complaint, Passman's conduct violated
the Fifth Amendment; and that Passman's conduct was not
shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution,
Art. I, § 6, cl. 1.7
'Davis also sought equitable relief in the form of reinstatement , as well
as a promotion and s ahll'~ · increase. App., at 4-5. Since Passman is no
longer a Congrr:;:oman, however, see n . 1, supra, these forms of relief are
no longer available.
6 Passman also argued that his alleged conduct was "not violative of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution," and that relief was barred "by
reason of the sovereign immunity doctrine and the official immunity doctrine." App., at 8.
8 The District Court al:;o ruled that, although "the doctrines of sovereign
and official immunity" did not justify di:omissal of Davis' complaint, "the
discharge of plaintiff on alleged grounds of sex discrimination by defendant
is not violative of the Fifth Amendment to the Con:;titution ." App., at 9.
7 The panel abo held that, although sovereign immunity did not bar a
damages award aguin:lt Pas:;man individually, he was entitled at trial to
a defense of qualified immunity.
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en bane,
reversed the decision of the panel. The en bane Court did not
reach the merits, nor diJ it discuss the application of the Speech
or Debate Clause. The Court instead held that "no right of
action may be implied from the Due Process Clause of the
fifth amendment." 571 F. 2d, a.t 801. The Court reached
this conclusion on the basis of the criteria that had been set
out in ./Cart v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975), for determining
whether a private cause of action should be implied from a
federal statute. 8 Noting that Congress had failed to create ~;t
1 The criteria set out in Cort v. Ash nrc:
"First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted,' Texas & Pacific R . Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 39
(1916) (cmphatiis supplied)-that i;;, does the statute create a fed eral
right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indicntion of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? See, e. g., National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of
Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 458, 460 (19-i4) (Amt rak ). Third,
is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? See, e. g., Amtrak, supra; Securities Investor Ptotection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U. S. 412, 423 (1975);
Calhoon v. Har bey, 3i9 U. S. 134 (1964). And finally, is the cause of
action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area · basically the
concern of the ~tates, so that it would ·be inappropriate to infer a cause
of action batied solely on federal law? See Wheeldin v. TV heeler, 373 U. S.
647, 652 (1963); cf. J. I . Case Co. v. Borak. 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 394-395
· (1971); id., at .400 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment)." 422 U. S.,
at 78.
The Court of' Appeals had some difficulty applying these criteria to
· determine whether a cause of action should be implied under the Constitution. It eventually concluded, however, (1) that although "t he fifth
· amendment right to due procesti certainly confers a right upon Davis, the
injury nlleged here does not infringe this right as directly as" the violation
of the Fourth Amendment rights alleged in Bivens, 571 F. 2d, at 797;
· (2) that "[ c]ongressional remedial legislation · for employment discrimit-1~~ nation h:ts care~ully a~·~idcd ~rratin~ a. cause of action_ for ~on~y damages
{
I for Qne m Dav1~' pos1t10n," 1d., at.. l98; (3) tlutt, unhkc vJOlat1ons of th~

!

(

____

....,.
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damages remedy for those in Davis' position, the Court also
concluded that "the proposed damage remedy is not constitu·
tionally compelled" so that it was not necessary to "counter·
mand the clearly discernible will of Congress" and create such
a remedy. 571 F. 2d, at 800.

II
In Bivems v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, supra, federal agents had allegedly
arrested and searched Bivens without probable cause, thereby
subjecting him to great humiliation, embarrassment, and
mental suffering. Bivens held that the Fourth Amendment
guarantee against "unreasonable searches and s~izures" was a
constitutional right which Bivens could enforce through a
private cause of action, and that a dam~s remedy was an
appropriate form of redress. ~ast Term, Butz· v. Economou,
438 U. S. 478 (1978), reaffirmed this holding, stating that
"the decision in Bivens established that a citizen suffer·
ing a compensable injury to a constitutionally protected
interest could invoke the general federal-question jurisdiction
of the district courts to obtain an award of monetary damages
I
against the responsible federal official." I d., at 504.
Today we hold that Bivens and Butz require reversal of the·
holding of the en bane Court of Appeals. Our inquiry proceeds in three stages. We hold ~illthat, preterm1ttmg the·
q~estion""'Whethe;-;espondent's conduct is shielded by the A< k..c J<,(_ ,lo
Speech or Debate Clause, the right asserted by petitioner
5~/l. ~
is justiciable; ~ that petitioner has stated a cause of
that relief in
action which asserts this right; and
dam11ges constitutes an appropriate form of remedy.

/J:!:j .

-

lffifiill

Fourth Amendmrnt, "the brea.dth of the concept of due process indicates
that the damagr remedy sought will not be judicially manngrable," id.,
at 799; and (4) that implying a cause of action under the Due Process
Clause would create "the danger of deluging Jedernl courts with claims
otherwise rcdressable in ~tate courts or administrative proceedings ...."..
/d., at SOO;

J8-50J~P!N!O!j
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A
The Fifth Amendment provides that "{n]o person shall
be . . . deprived of life, liberty 1 or prop~rty, ~ithou·t d~e
process of law . . . . " In numl:lrol.ls decisions, this Court
"has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids the Federal Government from denying equal
protection of the laws; E. g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426 U. S. 88, 100 ( 1976); Buckl'ey v. Valeo, 424 U. S. ·l, _93
(1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. 8; 636, 638 :n. 2
(1975); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (H!54)." Va~ce
v. Bradley, U. S. - , n.' 1• (1979). "To withstand
scrutiny under the equal protection component . o.f th'e Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, 'classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives 'a nd niust . be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.'
'craig v. Boren, 429 U. ~.~, 1.~0, )97 (1976)." · Califano v,
·
.
· .
Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316- 317 (1977). 9
The Equal Protection Componei1t of the Due Proqess Cla.use
thus confers on petitioner a feder~l constitutional right to be
free from gender discrimination which cannot meet these
requirements. 10 Respond~nt argues, however, that in this case
~uch a right is nonjusticiable because judicial determination of
the "important governmental obj~ctives" served by gender-.
'

I

1

.·,

I

o

•

""'··

o•

\

9

·.,

Before . it can be determined whether .petitioner's Fifth Amendment
right has been viol!\t~d, the,re for~, jnquiry J~ust be undertaken into what
"important goyernn~,enta~ .obje c t.~":~s, " if any, a~e ~erved by the genderbased en1ploytr\ent . q( congre;sional staff.. Sec 'n, 20, infra. We express
no views as to,. the ol1tcome of..this inquiry. JVe note only that if such
gender-based en1ployment docs not serve '·' important governmental objectives'' or, is n.qt "substantially related to the achiev.en1ent" of such objectives, th~ .r.equirements of the F!fth Amendment will have been violated.
" 10 This tight is personal; it i~ petitioner, after all, who mu:st suffer the
effects of such discrimination. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, - ,
U. 1 S. .- , n. 1:3 (1979) ; ef. Monongah ela Navigation Co. v. United
States 1 148 U.S. 312, 326 (189:3).

}
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based employment of congressional staff will necessarily involve
a "lack of respect due coordinate branches of government."
Balcer v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217 (1962). Respondent fears
that if petitioner's right is enforced, "the judiciary soon will
be dictating to Congressmen and Congresswomen how their
legislative responsibilities should be performed in the sense
that it will dictate by whom they should be performed."
Brief for Respondent 22.
We disagree. The S~use of the Constitution, Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, functwns "to protect the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the independence
of individual legislators." United States v. Brewster, 408
U. S. 501, 507 (1972). It is a paradigm example of "a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an]
issue to a coordinate political department." Balcer v. Carr,
supra, at 217. A Congressman must of course be free to
hire th staff necessary or 1111 to function "within Jhe
'sphere of e 1ma e egis at1ve activity.' " Eastland~ v.
Umte
tates Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491, 501 (1975).
See Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 616-617 (1972).
If petitioner's employment was in fact of this nature, respondent will be shielded with absolute immunity by the Clause,
"not only from the consequences of litigation's results, but
also from the burden of defending [himself]." Dombrowski
v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967). But if respondent's conduct is not protected by the Clause, it will be because peti~n
er's position was so unrelated to "the le islative rocess" t at
the ins Itutional interests of the Congress as a coordinate
aepartment will not be impaired by judicial review of respondent's liability for the termination of her employment.
The en bane Court of Appeals did not decide whether ~~
respondent was shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause. We
~o.~t.
also intimate no view 1 hat issue. We conclude only that
S;,~
if the Clause s 1ould not apply, the question whether respond~nt's dismis~al of 1)etitioner violated her Fifth Amendment
~~

78-5072-0PINION
DAVIS v. PASSMAN

8

rights would, as we stated in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S.
486 (1969),
"require no more than an interpretation of the Constitu~
tion. Such a determination falls within the traditional
role accorded courts to interpret the ·law, and does not
involve a 'lack of respect due [a] coordinate branch of
government,' nor does it involve an 'initial policy deter~
ruination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.1
. Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, at 217." 395 U. S., at
548-549.
We hold, therefore, that if respondent's dismissal of petitioner
w-;;;ot within the sph~re of legitimate legislative activity
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, petitioner's claim
sets forth a justiciable right. We inquire next whether petitioner has a cause of action to assert this right.

B
It is clear that the District Court had jurisdiction under 28
U. S. C. § 1331 (a) to consider petitioner's claim. Bell v.
Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946). It is equally clear, a.nd the
-en bane Court of Appeals so held, that the Fifth Amendment
confers on petitioner a constitutional right to be free from
'illegal discrimination. 11 Yet the Cour of A . Jeals cone! ded
that etitioner could not enforce this rigl1t ·bee u~ she I c ed
a~1. T e meaning o t is missing "cause .of
action," however, is far from apparent.
Almost half a century ago Justice Cardozo rec0gnized that
a "'cause of action' may mean one thing for one purpose and
something different for another." Vnited States v. Memphis
11 The restraints of tlw Fifth Amendment reach far enough to t>mbrace
the official actions of a Congrrssman in hiring and dis mis~ ing his employees. That respondent's conduct may l1ave been illegal does not suffice
to trans-form it into merely private action. "[P]ower, once granted, docs
not disappear like a magic gift wl1en it is wrongfully used." Bivens,
supra, at 392. See Ilome Telephone and Telegraph Co. 1V. Los Angeles.

1.27

u.s. 278,287-289

(1913).
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Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 67-68 (1933). 12 The phrase
apparently became a legal term of art when the New York
Code of 1848 abolished the distinction between actions at law
and suits in equity and simply required a plaintiff to include
in his complaint "[a] statement of the facts constituting the
cause of action . . . . " 13 New York Code of Practice in Civil
Actions § 120 (2) ( 1848). By the first third of the 20th
century, however, the phrase had become so encrusted with
doctrinal complexity that the authors of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure eschewed it altogether, requiring only that a
complaint contain 1'a sh'O;ta;a p~ statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 8 (a). See Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre,
Inc., 133 F. 2d 187, 189 (CA2 1943). Nevertheless, courts and
commentators have continued to use the phrase "cause of
action" in the traditional sense established by the Codes to
refer roughly to the alleged invasion of "recognized lega:l
rights" upon which a litigant bases his claim for relief.H
Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S.
682, 693 (1949).
See United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745, 748 (1947); Arnold,
The Code 'Cause of Action' Clarified by United States Supreme Court, 19
A. B. A. J. 215 ( 1933).
13 See Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 Yale L. J. 817, 820 (1924);
Blume, The Scope of a Civil Action, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 257 (1943).
14 See, e. g., United States v. Employing Plasterers Association, 347 U. S.
186 (1954); 2A Moore's Federal Practice ~ 8.13, at 1704-1705 ("Perhaps
it is not entirely accurate to say, as one court ba::; said, that 'it is only
necessary to state a claim in the pleading::i . .. and not a cause of action.'
While the Hules have substituted 'claim' or 'claim for relief' in lieu of the
older and troublesome term 'cause of action,' the pleading still must state
a 'cause of action' in the sense that it mu8t slww 'that the pleader is
entitled to relief.' It is not enough to indicate merely that the plaintiff
has a grievance but sufficient detail must be given so that the defendant,
and the court, can obtain a fair idea of what the plaintiff is complaining,
and can sec that here is some legal basis for recovery.") (footnotes
' 'Omitted).
There was, of C011rsc, great controversy concerning the exact meaning
12
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This is not the meaning of the "cause of action" which the
'Court of Appeals below refused to imply from the Fifth
Amendment, however, for the Court acknowledged that petitioner had alleged an invasion of her constitut:onal right to
be free from illegal discrimination.1 " Instead the Court of
Appeals appropriated the meaning of the phrase "cause of
action" used in the many cases in which this Court has parsed
congressional enactments to determine whether the rights and
obligations so created could be judicially enforced by a particular "class of litigants." Cannon v. University of Chicago,
U. S. - , (1979). Securities Investor Protection
'Corp. (SIPC) v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975), for example,
·held that although ''Congress' primary purpose in . . . creating the SIPC was ... the protection of investors," and
although investors were thus "the intended beneficiaries of the
·[Securities Investor Protection] Act [of 1970] ," 84 Stat. 1635,
15 U. S. C. § 78aaa et seq., investors nevertheless had no
private cause of action judicially to compel SIPC "to commit
its funds or otherwise to act for the protection" of investors.
!d., at 418, 421. · We hela that under the Act only the
· Securities and Exchange Commission had a cause of action
enabling it to invoke judicial authority to ·require SIPC .t()
' Qf the phrase "cause of action" in the Codes. See id ., at § 2.06, p. 35Q
n. 26; J. Pomeroy, Code Hcmrdies 459-466 (4th ed. 1904); Wheaton, The
' Code 'Cause of Action': Its Definition, '22 Corn. L. Q: 1 (1936); Clark,
wpra n. 13, at 837.
15 The Court of Appeals apparently found ·t11at petitioner Jacked a
· '" cause of action" in the sense t1~ a cause of action would have been
·supplied by 42 U. S. C. §"1983. Chapman v. Ho·uston Welfare Right'S
Org.,- U.S.- (1979), holds this Term that, although§ 1983 serves
"to ensure that an individual [ha~l a cause of action for violations of the
Constitution," the statutr itself ''does not provide any substantive rights
at all." /d ., at - . Section 198;3, of cour~c, provides a c:m.;e of action}
·only for deprivations of constitutional right:; that occur "under color
·of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .or
'Territory,, an<il tlrus has no application to .this case.

l

I
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perform its statutory obligations. On the other hand, Texas
& N. 0. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks,
281 U. S. 548 (1930). held that ~ 2 of the Railway Labor Act
of 1926, 44 Stat. 577, 45 U. S. C. § 152, which provides that
railroad employees be able to designate representatives "without interference. influence, or coercion. '' did not confer
11
1nerely an abstract right." but was judicially enforceable
through a private cause of action. 16 !d., at 558, 567- 568.
In cases such as these, the question is which class of litigants may enforce in court legislatively created rights or
obligations. If a litigant is an appropriate party to invoke
the power of the courts, it is said that he has a 11 cause of
action" under the statute, and that this cause of action is a
·necessary clement of his "claim." So understood, the question
whether a litigant has a "cause of action" is analytically
distinct and prior to the question of \vhat relief, if any, a
) litigant may be entitled to receive. The concept of a "cause
of action" is employed specifically to determine who may
judicially enforce the statutory rights or obligations. 17
16 Texas & N. 0. R . Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks,
supra, is now understood as having implied a "cause of action" alt hough
the opinion it self did not u ~c the phrase . See Cannon v. University of
Chicago, supra, at n . 13.
17 Thus it may be said that jurisdiction is a question of whether a federal

court has the power, under the Constitution or laws o"f the United States,
to hear a case, see Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Ry . Co. v.

8-u·an, 111 U. S. 379 , 384 (1884) ; j\Jontana-Dakota Utilities Co . v.
Northwestern Public Service Co ., 341 U. S. 246, 249 ( 1951) ; standing is
a question of whether a plaintiff is sufficiently adversary to a defendant
to create an Art. III case or controversy , or a t least to overcome prudential limitations on federal court jurisdiction, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 .
U. S. 490, 498 (1975); cause of action is a question of whether a particular plaintiff is a member of the clas::; of litigants tha t may, as a matter
of law, appropria tely invoke the power of the court ; and relief is a question of the various remedies a federal court may make available. A
plaintiff may have a cause of action evC'n though he be entitled to no
relief at all, as, for example, when a defendant in a suit for damages is
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It is in this sense that the Court of Appeals concluded that
petitioner lacked a cause of action. The Court of Appeals
reached this conclusion through the application of the criteria
set out in Cart v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975), for ascertaining
whether a private cause of action may be implied from "a
statute not expressly providing one." /d., at 78. 18 The Court
of Appeals used these criteria to determine that those in
petitioner's position should not be able to enforce the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, and that petitioner therefore had no cause of action under the Amendment. This was
error, for the question of who may enforce a statutory right is
·clothed with absolute immunity . See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349
(1978).
The Court of Appeals appea red to confuse the question of whether petitioner had standing with the question of whether she had asserted a proper
cause of action. See National Railroad Passeuger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 465 n. 13 (1974). Although
the Court acknowledged the existence of petitioner's con:stitutional right,
571 F . 2d, at 797-798, it concluded that she had no cause of action in
part because "the injury alleged here does not infringe this right as
directly as the injury inflicted in the unreasonable se:.~rc h of Webster
Bivens offended the fourth amendment." /d. , at 797. The nature of
petitioner's injury, however , is relevant to the determination of whether
she has "alleged such a per~onal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adver:seness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962) .
See Duke Power Co. \'. Carolina Environmental Study Group. Inc., 438
U. S. 59, 72 (1978 ). And under the criteria we havr :set out, prtitioner
clearly has standing to bring thi:s suit. If the allegations of her complaint
are taken to be true, shr has :shown that :;he "personally has ~uffe red :some
actual or thrrate~d injury a::; a rr;;ult of tlJC putatively illega l conduct of
the defend:wt." Gladstvue Realtors v. Village of BellCoovd. U. S. - ,
(19711) Whethrr petitioner has assertrd a cause of action, however,
depend:>
~n th<· quality or extent of her injury, but on whether thr
clas:; of li 1;:;ants of which petitioner i ~ a member may u ~r the courts to
enforc<· thl' right at i s~ ue . The foc11:; mu:;t therefore be on the nature of
the right petitioner as~erts .

ts See n. 8,

~upra.
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fundamentally different than the question of who may enforce
a right that is protected by tl1e Constitution.
Statutory rights and obligations are established by Congress,
and it is entirely appropriate for Congress, in c,,:eating these
rights and obligatio11s, to determine in addition who may
enforce them and in what manner. For example, statutory
rights and obligations are often elnbedded in complex regulatory schemes, so that if they are not enforced through private
causes of action, they may nevertheless be enforced through
alternative mechanisms, such as criminal prosecutions, see
Cort v. Ash, supra, or other public ca'Uses of actions. See
:Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, supra; Nationlzl Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of
Railroad Passengers, supra, at 457. In eacl1 case, how~ver,
the question is the nature of the legisla'tlve intent informing
a specific statute, and Cort set out the criteria through which
this intent could be disc~
The Constitution, on the other hand, does not "partake of
the prolixity of a legal code." M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 407 (1819). lt speaks instead with a majestic
simplicity. One of "its important objec'ts,·" ibid., is the designation of rights. And in "its great outlines," ibid., the
judiciary is clearly discernible as the primary means through
which these rights may be enforced. As james Madison
's tated when he presented the ·Bill of R'i ghts to the Congress:
"If [these rights] are incorporated into the Constitution,
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves
in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they
will be an impenetrable ·bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will
be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights
expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights." 1 Annals of Congress 439 (Gales &
Seaton, eds. 1834).
At least in the absci\ce of "a textually demonstrable
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constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate
political department." Ba.ker v. Carr, supra, at 217, we pre~
sume that justiciable constitutional rights are to · be en~
forced through the courts. And, unless such rights are te
become merely precatory, the class of those litigants who
allege that their own constitutional rights have been violated,
and who at the same time have no effective means other than
the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able to invoke
the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of
their justiciable constitutional rights. "The very essence of
civil liberty," wrote Chief ·Justice Marshall in Marl.Yury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137. 163 (1803) , "certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of
government is to afford that protection." Traditionally,
therefore, "it is established practice for this Court to sustain
the jurisdiction of fed eral courts to issue injunctions to protect
rights safeguarded by the Constitution and to restrain individual state officers from doing what the 14th Amendment
forbids the State to do." Bell v. Hood, supra, at 684. See
Bivens, supra, at 400 (Harlan. J., concurring in judgment).
Indeed , this Court has already settled that a cause of action
may be implied directly under the Equal Protection Component of the Due Proces Clause of the Fifth Amendment in favor of those who seek to enforce this constitutional
right. 19 The plaintiffs in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497
(1954), for example, claimed that they had been refused
admission into certain public schools in the District of Columbia solely on account of their race. They rested their suit
directly on the Fifth Amendment and on the general federal
question jurisdiction of the district courts, 28 U. S. C. § 1331.
19 Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933), held that a plaintiff wh0o
alleged that his properly had been taken by the United States for public
use without just compensation could . bring suit directly under. the Fifth:
Amendment,

I
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The District Court dismissed their complaint for failure "to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 12 (b)(6). This Court reversed. Plaintiffs were
clearly the appropriate parties to bring such a suit, and this
Court held that equitable relief should be made available.
349 u.s. 294 (1955).
Like the plaintiffs in Bolling v. Sharpe, supra, petitioner
rests her claim directly on the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. She claims that her rights under the
Amendment have been violated, and that she has no effective
means other than the judiciary to vindicate these rights. 20

°CJa.use 9 of Rule XLIII of the House of Representatives prohibits sex
discrimination as part of the Code of Official Conduct of the House:
"A l\lrmbC'r, officer, or employ('(' of the Hou~e of Hrpre ' entativrs shall
not discharge or refuse to hire any individual, or otherwi. e di~criminate
against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."
Clause 9 was adopted on January 14, 1975 , see 121 Cong. Rec . 22,
approximately six months aftrr petitioner's discharge. In 1977 the House
Commission on Administrative Review (the "Obey Commission") termed
"the anti-discrimination provisions of Rule XLIII ... all but unenforceable." Commission on Administrative Review , R ecommendations and
Rationales Concerning Admini ·t rative Units and Work l\Ianagement, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., 53 (Comm. Print. 1977). The Commi~sion recommended
the establishment of a Fair Employment Practices Panel to provide nonbinding conciliation in cases of allrged violations of Clause 9. See H. R.
Res. 766, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 504 (1977); Commission on Administrative Review, supra, at 52-5:3. This proposal was prcvrnted from reaching the House floor, howe\'er, when the House defeated the Rule which
would have govemed ron idrration of the Obey Commission's resolution.
See 123 Cong. Rec. Hl0819-28 (Oct. 12 , 1977) .
On September 25, 1978. H. R . He!>. 1380 was introduced calling for the
implementation of Clause 9 through the creation of "a House Fair
Employment Hclat10n ~ Board, a Hou:se Fair Employmrnt Relation ~ Office,
and procedures for hranng and ::;cttling complaints alleging violations of
Clause 9 of Rule XLIII . . . . " II . R Res. 1:380, 95th Cong., 2d Scss.,
§ 2 (1978) . H. R. RP:;. 13~0 wa;; referred to the House Committeps on
Administration and Hulcs, where it apparently langui:shr d. SrP 124 Cong.
2

78-5072-0PINION
DAVIS v. PASSMAN

16

We conclude, therefore, that she is an appropriate party to
invoke the general federal question jurisdiction of the District
Court to seek relief. She has a cause of action under the
Fifth Amendment. 21
Although petitioner has a cause of action, her complaint
might nevertheless be dismissed under Rule 12 (b)(6) unless
it can be determined that judicial relief is available. We
therefore proceed to consider whether a damages remedy is ~n
· appropriate form of relief,
'C
We approach this inquiry on the basis of established law.
"[I]t is
well settled that where legal rights have been
invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to
· sue for such invasion, federal courts ma.y use any available
remedy to make good the wrong·done." Bell v. Hood, supra,
at 684. Bivens, supra, holds that in appropriate circumstances
a federal district court may provide relief in damages for the
violation of constitutional rights if there are "no special factors

--o

o

o

· Rec. H10697 (Sept. 25, ' 1978) . The House failed to consider it before
adjournment.
There presently exi~ts a volnnt ary House Fair Employment Practices
Agreement. Members of the House who have signed the Agreement elect
a House Fair Employmrnt Practices Committee, which has authority. to
investigate cases of alleged di:;crimination among participating f\lembers.
The Committee has no enforcement powers.
· 21 Five Courts of Appeals have implied causes of action directly under
the Fifth Amendmrnt. Sec Apton v. Wilson, 165 U. S. App. D. C. 22,
506 F. 2d 83 (1974); Sullivan v. Murphy, 15G U. S. App. D . C. 28, 478
F. 2d 938 (1973); United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F. 2d 892
(CA3 1972); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F. 2d 1291 (CA4 1978), cert. pending
sub nom. Moffit v. Loe, No. 78-1260; State Marine · Lines, Inc . v. Shultz,
498 F. 2d 1146 (CA4 1974); Green v. Carlson, 581 F. 2d 669 (CA7 1978),
cert. pending, No. 78-1261; Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional. Planni11(J Agency,
· 566 F. 2d 1353 (CA9 1977), rever:;ed in part and affirmed in part on
other ground:; sub tWill. Lake Country Estates, /uc. v. Tahue llegiuual
Planning Agency, U. S. (19i9); Bennet v. Campbell, 5G4 F. 2d
329 (CA9 19i7).
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counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress." !d., at 3DG. Sec Butz v. Economou, supra, at 504.
First, a damages remedy is surely appropriate in this case.
"Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary
remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty."
Bivens, supra, at 395. Relief in damages would be judicially
manageable, for the case presents a focused remedial issue
without difficult questions of valuation or causation. See id.,
at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). Litigation under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has given federal
courts great experience evaluating claims for backpay due to
illegal sex discrimination. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (g).
Moreover, since respondent is no longer a Congressman, see
n. 1, supra, equitable relief in the form of reinstatement would
be unavailing. And there are available no other alternative
forms of relief. For Davis, as for Bivens, "it is damages or
nothing." 22 Bivens, supra, at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in
judgment).
Second, there are in this case "no special factors counselling
hesitation." "[F] ederal fiscal policy," for example, is not
implicated. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301,
311 (1947). · And, although the defendant in this suit was, at
the time petitioner's complaint was filed , a United States
Congressman, we apply the principle that "legislators ..•·
22

Respondent does not dispute petitioner's claim that she "has no cause
of action under Loui ~ iana law." Brief for Petitioner 19. See 3 Empl.
Prac. Guide (CCH) 23,548 (Ang. 1978). And it is far from clear that
a state court would have authority to effect n, damages remedy against a
United States Congrcs~man for illegal actions in the course of his official
conduct, even if a plaintiff's claim were grounded in 1he United States
Constitution. See Tarble's Case, ·13 Wall . :397 (1871). Deference to
state court adjudication in a case such as l11is would in any event not serve
the purposes of federali~ m, since it involves the applicntion of the Fift11
Amendment to a federal ofTicer in the cour~e of hi:> federal duties. It is
therefore particularly appropriate that a federal court be the forum in
which a damages remedy be awarded.

,f

'18-5072-0PINION
18

DAVIS v. PASSMAN

ought generally to be bound by [the law] as are ordinary
persons." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615 (1972).
Cf. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 320 (1973). As Butz v.'
Economou stated only last Term :
"Our system of jurisprudence rests on the assumption
that all individuals, whatever their position in government, are subject to federal law:
"'No man in this country is so high that he is above the
law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance
with impunity. All officers of the government, from the
highest to the lowest. arc creatures of the law, and are
bound to obey it. ' United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. [ 196,]
220 [ ( 1882)] ." 438 P. S., at 506
Third, there is in this case "no explicit congressional declaration that persons" in petitioner's j)osit~n injured by unconstitutional federal employment discrimination "may not recover
money damages from" those responsible for the injury.
Bivens, supra, at 397. (Emphasis supplied.) While such_ a
declaration would not nece saril be bindin on this Court, it
wo
e a factor to consider in etermimng w at relief iS
a~e Court of Appeals apparently interpreted
§ 717 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 86 Stat.
111, 42 U.S. C.§ 2000e-16. as an explicit congressional prohibition against judicial remedies for those in petitioner's position.
When § 717 was added to Title VII to protect federal em- ployees from discrimination , it failed to extend this protection
to congressional employees such as petitioner who are not in
the competitive service." ~ See 42 l!. S. C. ~ 2000e-16 (a).
There is no evidence, however. that Congtess mean.t,. § 71.1..to
foreclose a lten.;t'ive .remedies available to those not covere
23 Since petitioner was not in the competitive service, sec n. 2 supra,
the remedial provisions of § 717 of Title VII are not availablr to her. In.
Brown v. General Ser vices Ad111inistrativn , 425 U.S. 820 (197G), wr held
that the rrmcdir~ pro,·idcd by § 717 arc exclu:sive for tho~ c federal rm~ ·
ployces co\'crcd by the ::;ta.tulc.
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by the statute. Such silence is far from "the clearly discernible will of Congress" perceived by the Court of Appeals. 571
F. 2d, at 800. And we are particularly loathe to read this
silence as a prohibition of all judicial relief for respondent's alleged violation of petitioner 's Fifth Amendment right, because,
so interpreted. § 717 \vould "practically ... deny the right."
Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451, 457 (1904). The "right would
be sacrificed or obliterated if it were without ... remedy .... "
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 207
(1944). This interpretation of§ 717 would raise serious questions concerning its constitutionality. See Brinkerhoff-Faris
1'rust & Savings Co. v. Hill , 281 U. S. 673, 682 (1930); cf.
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361 , 366-367 (1974). In such
cases "'it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question [s] may be )
avoided.' Crowell v. B enson , 2851!. S. 22. 62 ( 1932) ." United
States\'. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363. 369 (1971).
See National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of '
U. S. - , (1979). \Ve therefore do not
Chicago, inter )ret § 717 to foreclose the availabilit of a damages
remedy to 1ose m petitioner's positwn.
F f:1ally, the Court of Appeals appeared concerned that, if a.
damages remedy were made available to petitioner, the danger
existed <~of deluging federal courts with claims ... .'' 571
F. 2d , at 800. \Ve do 110t perceive the potential for such
a deluge. By virtue of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, a damages remedy
is already available to redress injuries such as petitioner's
when they occur under color of state law. Moreover, a plaintiff seeking a damages remedy under the Constitution must
first demonstrate that his constitutional rights have been
violated. We do not hold that every tort by a federal official
may be redressed in damages. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373
·u. S. 647 (1963). And, of course, were Congress to create
'eq·ually effective alternative remedies, the need for damages

. .

\
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relief might be obviated. See Bivens, supra, at 397. But
perhaps the most fundamental answer to the concerns expressed by the Court of Appeals is that provided by Justice
Harlan concurring in Biven:
"Judicial resources, I am well aware, are increasingly
scarce these days. Nonetheless, when we automatically
close the courthouse door solely on this basis, we implicitly express a value judgment on the comparative
importance of classes of legally protected interests. And
current limitations upon the effective functioning of the
courts arising from budgetary inadequacies should not be
permitted to stand in the way of the recognition of otherwise sound constitutional principles." 403 U. S., at 411.
We conclude, therefore, that in this case, a.s in Bivens, if
petitioner is able to prevail on the merits, she should be able
to redress her injury in damages, a 11 remedial mechanism
normally available in the federal courts." Bivens, supra, at
397.

III
We hold today that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, en bane, must be reversed because petitioner has a
cause of action under the Fifth Amendment, and because her
injury may be redressed by a damages remedy. The Court of
Appeals did not consider, however, whether respondent's conduct was shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause of the
Constitution. Accordingly, we do not reach this question.
And, of course, we express no opinion as to the merits of
petitioner's· complaint.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
o.~inion •. .
So ordered.
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May 9, 1979
Re:

~

78-5072 - Davis v. Passman

Dear Bill:
My apologies for being so slow in responding to your
letter of April 23, 1979. Frankly, I have vacillated a good
deal in my consideration of the Speech or Debate Clause
problem, and now have an opinion that is different from the one
I expressed at the Conference on April 20.
Logically there are at least three different ways in which
the Speech or Debate Clause might be applied to a congressman's
employment practices; (1) that all staff decisions are
protected, because even file clerks and messengers may
occasionally be called upon to perform confidential and
important functions, or be in training for greater
responsibilities and because any attempt to decide which
employees are covered and which are not would itself involve
the kind of questioning the Clause was intended to avoid; (2)
that only the hiring, promotion, and discharge of employees who
function within the sphere of 1eg5timate ~egislative activity
are protected; or (3) that the Clause has no application at a11
to employment practices.
Your draft opinion--consistentJy with the assumption made
by the parties--decides that the second interpretation is the
correct one. For two reasons I am troubJed about making that
decision now.
First, I do not think we have had the issue
ad~quately argued; second, the very inquiry into the kind of
duties that Davis did perform--or would perform if she had
received her expected promotion--involves the kind of inquiry
into legislators' activities that the constitutional privilege
may have sought to prevent. To avoid that kind of inquiry, it
may be more consistent with the purposes of the Clause to adopt
either the first or the third of the alternatives I have just
identified.

l

As of now, if the Speech or Debate issue is to be remanded
to the Fifth Circuit, I believe that court should be free to
decide the question on an entirely clean slate.
I wouJd
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Admittedly, such an omission would magnify the tension
between this case and Proxmire. Nevertheless, I think there
are valid reasons for dec1d1ng the cause of action issue first
in this case. No matter how we approach the .case, the decision
of one question will avoid, or at least postpone, the ·decision
of another difficult constitutional question. For me the
answer to the cause of action question is clearl controll d by
Bivens whereas
e peec o
e a e question remains doubtful.
j4fh erefore-am comi or EaSte i n o ec1 a 1ng the cause of actton
question first. Moreover, notwithstanding the des~rabi1ity of
having a defense based on the Speech or Debate Clause terminate
the litigation immediately, that is not possible in this case
if there must be discovery into the character of Davis'
duties. As a purudential matter in this case I am therefore
prepared to join the Bivens holding and to postpone the entire
Speech and Debate Clause question until the Fifth Circuit has
decided it.
I have these additional problems with your opinion:
a. Page 6 n. 9:
the footnote?

Could you omit the last sentence of

b. Page 17:
I am not sur.e it is quite accurate to
say flatly that there are "no special factors
counseling hesitation" in this case. For me, the
respect that one coordinate branch of government owes
to another is such a special factor.
I am persuaded,
however, that this factor--to the extent that it is
relevant--is protected by the Speech or Debate Clause
as well as the possibility of a qualified immunity if
that Clause does not apply in any event.
I think this
point may need a little more explication.

'

c. Pages 18-19. I have two questions about the
treatment of § 717.
In my opinion the most important
reason § 717 does not defeat Davis' claim is that the
statute was not intended to displace any remedy that
previously existed: it neither adds to nor subtracts
from whatever Bivens-type claim Davis has.
I do not
agree that an explicit congressional determination
that Davis may not recover money damages "would not
necessarily be binding on this Court" (see page 18):
nor do I agree that such an "interpretation of § 717
would raise serious questions concerning its
constitutionality." See page 19.

-

3 -

Finally, I wonder if it is necessary, at the end of the
opinion, expressly to save the question whether Passman may
have the qualified immunity identified in your footnote 7.
Respectfully

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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May 9, 1979

_7_8_-_5_0_7_2_-__D_a_v_i_s_v_._P_a_s_s_m_a_n

Dear Bill:
My apologies for being so slow in responding to your
letter of April 23, 1979. Frankly, I have vacillated a good
deal in my consideration of the Speech or Debate Clause
problem, and now have an opinion that is different from the one
I expressed at the Conference on April 20.
Logically there are at least three different ways in which
the Speech or Debate Clause might be applied to a congressman's
employment practices~ (1) that all staff decisions are
protected, because even file clerks and messengers may
occasionally be called upon to perform confidential and
important functions, or be in training for greater
responsibilities and because any attempt to decide which
employees are covered and which are not would i tse 1_f involve
the kind of questioning the Clause was intended to avoid; (2)
that only the hiring, promotion, and discharge of employees who
function within the sphere of 1eg5timate ~egislative activity
are protected~ or (3) that the Clause has no application at all
to employment practices.
Your draft opinion--consistently with the assumption made
by the parties--decides that the second interpretation is the
correct one. For two reasons I am troubled about making that
decision now. First, I do not think we have had the issue
adequately argued; second, the very inquiry into the kind of
duties that Davis did perform--or would perform if she had
received her expected promotion--invoJves the kind of jnquiry
into legislators' activities that the constitutional privilege
may have sought to prevent.
To avoid that kind of inquiry, jt
may be more consistent with the purposes of the Clause to adopt
either the first or the third of the alternatives I have just
identified.
As of now, if the Speech or Debate issue is to be remanded
to the Fifth Circuit, I believe that court should be free to
decide the question on an entirely clean slate.
I wouJd
therefore prefer to omit the full paragraph on page 7 of your
second printed draft.

r

-

2 -

Admittedly, such an omission would magnify the tension
between this case and Proxmire. Nevertheless, I think there
are valid reasons for dec1d1ng the cause of action issue first
in this case.
No matter how we approach the .case, the decision
of one question will avoid, or at least postpone, the decision
of another difficult constitutional question.
For me the
answer to the cause of action question is clearly controlled by
Bivens whereas the Speech or Debate question remains doubtful.
I therefore am comfortable in deciding the cause of action
question first.
Moreover, notwithstanding· the desirability of
having a defense based on the Speech or Debate Clause terminate
the litigation immediately, that is not possible in this case
if there must be discovery into the character of Davis'
duties. As a purudential matter in this case I am therefore
prepared to join the Bivens holding and to postpone the entire
Speech and Debate Clause question until the Fifth Circuit has
decided it.
I have these additional problems with your opinion:
a.
Page 6 n. 9:
the footnote?

Could you omit the last sentence of

b.
Page 17:
I am not sure· it is quite accurate to
say flatly that there are "no special factors
counseling hesitation" in this case.
For me, the
respect that one coordinate branch of government owes
to another is such a special factor.
I am persuaded,
however, that this factor--to the extent that it is
relevant--is protected by the Speech or Debate Clause
as well as the possibility of a qualified immunity if
that Clause does not apply in any event.
I think this
point may need a little more explication.
c.
Pages 18-19. I have two questions about the
···--·treatment of § 717.
In my opinion the most important
reason § 717 does not defeat Davis' claim is that the
statute was not intended to displace any remedy that
previously existed; it neither adds to nor subtracts
from whatever Bivens-type claim Davis has.
I do not
agree that an explicit congressional determination
that Davis may not recover money damages "would not
necessarily be binding on this Court" (see page 18);
nor do I agree that such an "interpretation of § 717
would raise serious questions concerning its
constitutionality." See page 19.
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 11, 1979

Re:

78-5072 - Davis v. Passman

Dear Bill:
I am not ready to circulate a dissent in this case.
However, I write now to caution a possible conflict with
Helstoski if we indicate that the Speech or Debate Clause
is expansive enough to protect a Member's hiring
decisions.
Surely nothing in any prior decision gives
hint that the Clause is to be read so broadly.
Indeed,
the Conference majority in Helstoski and in Proxmire calls
for a narrower reading. That, I understand fully, is why
you will dissent in Proxmire. You have not finally
indicated whether you will participate in Helstoski.

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

May 14,

7R-507~

1~79

Davis v.

Pas~~an

PlPase ioin mo in your dissenting opinion .
J have b~en ~orkinq on a separate dissent that T
hooe will buttress vour views . r hope to rirculate it before
the week is out.

The

Chief Justice

Cooi~s

LFP/lab

to the Conferenre

lfp/ss
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No; - 78-5072 -Davis v; Passman
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting
Although I join the opinion of the Chief
Justice, I write separately to emphasize that no
prior decision of this Court justifies today•s
intrusion upon the legitimate p owers of Members of
Congress.
The Court's analysis starts with the
general proposition that "the judiciary is clearly
discernible as the primary means through which
[constitutional] rights may be enforced ...
13.

Ante, at

It leaps from this generalization to the

conclusion that an individual who has suffered an
injury to a constitutionallly protected interest,
and who lacks an

11

effective" alternative,

11

must be

able to invoke 11 federal court jurisdiction to
vindicate his "justiciable constitutional rights ...
Id., at 14. (emphasis supplied).

Apart from the

dubious logic of this reasoning, I know of no
precedent of this Court that supports such an
absolute statement of the federal judiciary's
obligation to entertain private suits that Congress
has not authorized.

On the contrary, I have

2.
thought it clear that federal courts must exercise
a principled discretion when called upon to infer a
private cause of action directly from the language
of the Constitution.
reasons

In the present case, for

summarized~ ~ by

the Chief Justice,

principles of comity and separation of powers
should require a federal court to stay its hand.
To be sure, it has been clear - at least
since Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) -that in appropriate
circumstances private causes of action may be
' f erre df rom prov1s1ons
..
1n
o f t he

-ti

c onst1tut1on.
..

a

) . *Paul: Here, include in a note the substance of the
f1rst couple of sentences on page 2 of your draft
citing Cannon and noting the difference between
inferring from provisions of the Constitution and
inferring from a statute.
I think it unwise for me
to put my Cannon dissent in a prominent position in
the next of this opinion.

3.
~~ Moreover, the federal courts have a

greater responsibilty under the Constitution for
the protection of rights derived directly from it
than for the definition and enforcement of rights
created solely by Congress.
J., concurring).

Id., at 407 (Harlan,

But the exercise of this

responsibility involves discretion, and a weighing
of relevant concerns.

As Mr. Justice Harlan stated

in Bivens, addressing this point,

~

the Court

should "take into account [a range of policy
considerations] at least as broad as the range of
those a legislature would consider with respect to
an express statutory authorization of a traditional
remedy."

Id. , at __ •

z.
JB./

Among the relevant policy consideration
that a court certainly

should consider in deciding

whether to imply a constitutional right of action
is that of comity toward an equal and coordinate
branch of government.

As Chief Justice Waite

observed over a century ago, "One branch of
government cannot encroach on the domain of another
without danger.

The safety of our institutions

depends in no small degree on a strict observance

4.
of this salutary rule."
700, 718 (1878).

Sinking Fund

C~ses,

9 Otto

Even where the authority of one

branch over a matter is not exclusive, so that a
federal court properly may accept jurisdiction over
the dispute, we have recognized that the principle
of separation of powers continues to have force as
a matter of policy.

For example, in United States

v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), we held on the one
hand that the question whether the President had a
claim of privilege as to conversations with his
advisers was an issue to be resolved by the
judiciary, and on the other hand that separationof-powers considerations required the recognition
of a qualified privilege.

A similar approach

should govern here.
Whether or not the employment decisions of
a member of Congress fall within the scope of the
Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, it is
clear that these decisions are intimately related
to the conduct of his duties.
o b serves,

~'

As the Chief Justice

.

1'~

a congressman necessar1'1 y re 1esAon

~~~ of ~
~

. d.1sc h arg1ng
.
\... ~ ~
.
h 1s
persona 1 sta ff 1n
~~
r~sibi~ities.

Because of the nature of his

5.

office, he must rely to an extraordinary degree on
the loyalty and compatibility of everyone who works
for him.
(1976)

Cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 377-388

(Powell, J., dissenting).

A

congressman simply cannot perform his
constitutional duties effectively, or serve his
constituents properly,

A~p-1-;;:::t;_~ ~
~~~

k~

hh-L

The foregoing would seem self evident

~.

even if Congress had not clearly indicated an
intention to reserve to its members the rightf to
select, employ and discharge staff personnel.

But

Congress unmistakably has made clear its view on
this subject.

It took pains to exempt itself from

'S

the coverage of Title

VII~

Unless the Court is

abandoning or modifying sub silentio our holding in
Brown v.

~eneral

Services Administration, 425 U.S.

820 (1976), that Title VII as amended "provides the
exclusive judicial remedy for claims of
discrimination in federal employment," id., at 835,
the exemption from this statute for congressional
employees should bar all judicial relief.
In sum, the decision of the Court today

6.
is not an exercise of principled discretion.

Its

opinion does not take into account the range of
policy and constitutional considerations that we
would expect a legislature to

~in

~~

determining whether a statutory remedy should be
A
enacted.

The

princip~ of

comity and the

constitutional doctrine of separation of powers are

~~f~·
·-~)

Indeed, in my view, the intrusion

upon and the limiting of the traditional authority
of a member of Congress to choose his own staff
simply cannot be

justified. ~
~OR~the

¥ *The justification
Court is that
it is the duty of courts to vindicate
constitutional rights - a duty no one disputes.
But it has never been thought that this duty
required a blind exercise of judicial power without
regard to other interests or constitutional
principles.
Indeed, it would not be unnatural for
the Congress to consider today's intrusion to be
wholly unwarranted, and to exercise its authority
to reassert the proper balance between the
legislative and judicial branches.
If the reaction
took the form of limiting the jurisdiction of
federal courts this conceivably could frustrate the
vindication of rights that properly are protected
by the court.
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No; - 78~5072 - Davis

v. Passman

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting
Although I join the opinion of the Chief
Justice that focuses on the serious constitutional
error of the Court's opinion, I write separately to
emphasize that no prior decision of this Court
justifies today's intrusion upon the legitimate
powers of Members of Congress.
The Court's analysis starts with the
general proposition that "the judiciary is clearly
discernible as the primary means through which
[constitutional] rights may be enforced."
13.

~,

at

It leaps from this generalization to the

declaration that an individual who has suffered to
a constitutionallly protected interest, and who
lacks an "effective" alternative, "must be able to
invoke" federal court jurisdiction to vindicate his
"justiciable constitutional rights".
(emphasis supplied).

Id., at 14.

Apart from any defect in the

logic of this reasoning from the general to the
specific, I know of no prior precedent of this
Court that supports such an absolute statement of
the federal judiciary's obligation to entertain

2.

private suits that Congress has not authorized.

On

the contrary, I have thought it clear that federal
courts must exercise a principled discretion when
called upon to infer a private cause of action
directly from the language of the Constitution.

In

the present case, for reasons summarized so well by
the Chief Justice, principles of comity and
separation of powers should require a federal court
to stay its hand.
To be sure, it has been clear - at least
since Bivens v. Six - unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) -that in appropriate
circumstances private causes of action may be
inferred from provisions of the Constitution.*

*Or, here, include in a note the substance of the
first couple of sentences on page 2 of your draft
citing Cannon and noting the difference between
inferring _from provisions of the Constitution and
inferring from a statute.
I think it unwise for me
to put my Cannon dissent in a prominent position in
this opinion.

lfp/ss
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting

~ ~

Although I join the opinion of the Chief
Justice, I write separately to emphasize that no
prior decision of this Court justifies today's
intrusion upon the legitimate powers of Members of
Congress.
The Court's analysis starts with the
general proposition that "the judiciary is clearly
discernible as the primary means through which
[constitutional] rights may be enforced."
13.

Ante, at

It leaps from this generalization to the

conclusion that an individual who has suffered an
injury to a constitutionallly protected interest,
and who lacks an "effective" alternative, "must be
able to invoke" federal court jurisdiction to
vindicate his "justiciable constitutional rights".
Id., at 14. (emphasis supplied).

Apart from the

dubious logic of this reasoning, I know of no
precedent of this Court that supports such an
absolute statement of the federal judiciary's
obligation to entertain private suits that Congress
has not authorized.

J4

On the contrary, I have

2.

thought it clear that federal courts must exercise
a principled discretion when called upon to infer a
private cause of action directly from the language
of the Constitution.

In the present case, for

reasons summarized so well by the Chief Justice,
principles of comity and separation of powers
should require a federal court to stay its hand.
To be sure, it has been clear - at least
since Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) -that in appropriate
circumstances private causes of action may be
inferred from provisions of the Constitution.*

*Paul: Here, include in a note the substance of the
first couple of sentences on page 2 of your draft
citing Cannon and noting the difference between
inferring from provisions of the Constitution and
inferring from a statute.
I think it unwise for me
to put my Cannon dissent in a prominent position in
the next of th1s opinion.

3.
Moreover, the federal courts have a
greater responsibilty under the Constitution for
the protection of rights derived directly from it
than for the definition and enforcement of rights
created solely by Congress.
J., concurring).

Id., at 407 (Harlan,

But the exercise of this

responsibility involves discretion, and a weighing
of relevant concerns.

As Mr. Justice Harlan stated

in Bivens, addressing this point, that the Court
should "take into account [a range of policy
considerations] at least as broad as the range of
those a legislature would consider with respect to
an express statutory authorization of a traditional
remedy."

Id., at
Among the relevant policy consideration

that a court certainly

should consider in deciding

whether to imply a constitutional right of action
is that of comity toward an equal and coordinate
branch of government.

As Chief Justice Waite

observed over a century ago, "One branch of
government cannot encroach on the domain of another
without danger.

The safety of our institutions

depends in no small degree on a strict observance

4.
of this salutary rule."
700, 718 (1878).

Sinking Fund Cases, 9 Otto

Even where the authority of one

branch over a matter is not exclusive, so that a
federal court properly may accept jurisdiction over
the dispute, we have recognized that the principle
of separation of powers continues to have force as
a matter of policy.

For example, in United States

v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), we held on the one
hand that the question whether the President had a
claim of privilege as to conversations with his
advisers was an issue to be resolved by the
judiciary, and on the other hand that separationof-powers considerations required the recognition
of a qualified privilege.

A similar approach

should govern here.
Whether or not the employment decisions of
a member of Congress fall within the scope of the
Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, it is
clear that these decisions are intimately related
to the conduct of his duties.

As the Chief Justice

observes, ante, a congressman necessarily relies on
his personal staff in discharging his
responsibilities.

Because of the nature of his

5.

office, he must rely to an extraordinary degree on
the loyalty and compatibility of everyone who works
for him.

Cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 377-388

( 1976) (Powell, J., dissenting).

A

congressman simply cannot perform his
constitutional duties effectively, or serve his
constituents properly, without a personally
congenial as well as competent staff.
The foregoing would seem self evident
even if Congress had not clearly indicated an
intention to reserve to its members the rights to
select, employ and discharge staff personnel.

But

Congress unmistakably has made clear its view on
this subject.

It took pains to exempt itself from

the coverage of Title VII ~Unless the Court is
abandoning or modifying sub silentio our holding in
B~own v~

General Servises

Admin~st~~tion,

425

u.s.

820 (1976), that Title VII as amended "provides the
exclusive iudicial remedy for claims of
discrimination in federal employment," id., at 835,
the exemption from this statute for congressiona·l
employees should bar all judicial relief.
In sum, the decision of the Court today

6.
is not an exercise of principled discretion.

Its

opinion does not take into account the range of
policy and constitutional considerations that we
would expect a legislature to consider in
determining whether a statutory remedy should be
enacted.

The principal of comity and the

constitutional doctrine of separation of powers are
given no weight.

Indeed, in my view, the intrusion

upon and the limiting of the traditional authority
of a member of Congress to choose his own staff
simply cannot be justified.*

*The justification relief on by the Court is that
it is the duty of courts to vindicate
constitutional rights - a duty no one disputes.
But it has never been thought that this duty
required a blind exercise of judicial power without
regard to other interests or constitutional
principles.
Indeed, it would not be unnatural for
the Congress to consider today's intrusion to be
wholly unwarranted, and to exercise its authority
to reassert the proper balance between the
legislative and judicial branches.
If the reaction
took the form of limiting the jurisdiction of
federal courts this conceivably could frustrate the
vindication of rights that properly are protected
by the court.
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

J

May 15, 1979

Re:

No. 78-5072 - Davis v. Passman

Dear Chief:
Please join me in your dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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SUPREME COURT F THE UNITED STATES
No. 78-5072
Shirley Davis, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to the United
v.
States Court of Appeals for the
Otto E. Passman.
Fifth Circuit.
[May -, 1979]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
Although I join the opinion of THE CHIEF JusTICE, I write
separately to emphasize that no prior decision of this Court
justifies today's intrusion upon the legitimate powers of
Membrrs of Congress.
The Court's analysis starts with thr general proposition that
"the judiciary is clearly disrrrnible as the primary means
through which rconstitutional] rights may be enforced," ante,
~t 13. It leaps fro:n this grner~liz~t~on, in t9rJUS...llDCQntrmre~ J ~
st!M, to the conclusiOn that an mchv1dual who has suffered an
~d~
injury to a constitutionally protected interest, and who lack an
---,- J
"effective" alternative, "must be able to invoke the existing
jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable
constitutional rights." I d. , at 14 (emphasis supplied). Apart
from the dubious logic of this reasoning. I know of no precedent of this Court that supports such an absolute statement
of the federal judiciary's obligation to entertain private suits
that Congress has not authorized. On the contrary, I have
thought it clear that federal courts must exercise a principled
discretion when called upon to infer a private ca.use of action
directly from the language of the Constitution. In the
present case, for reasons well summarized by THE CHIEF JusTICE, principles of comity and separation of powers should
require a federal court to stay its hand.
To be sure, it has been clear- at least since Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971)-that
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in appropriate circumstances private causes of action may be
inferred from provisions of the Constitution 1
oreover, the
federal courts have a~ greater responsibility under the Con- .5-k.-1stitution for the protection of those rights derived directly
.
from it, than for the definition and enforcement of rights
1
created solely by Congress ..< Bivens, supra, at 407 (Harlan,
J ., concurring). But the exercise of this responsibility involves discretion, and a weighing of relevant concerns. As
Mr. Justice Harlan observed in addressing this very point, a
court should "take into account [a range of policy considerations] at least as broad as the range of those a legislature
would consider with respect to an express statutory authorization of a traditional remedy." lbid. 2
have stated elsewhere my objections in princip e o e crea Ion of
private statutory causes of action by federal courts, a process that permits
the judiciary to arrogate to itself the power to re olve designated disputes
in contravention of the constitutional obligation of Congress to make such
decisions. See Cannon v. University of Chicago,- U.S.-,- (1979)
(PowELL, J., dissenting). I agree that the implication of private actions
from the provisions o the C nstitution Jresents a different problem. Id
A court necessarily as wider latitu e m m erpretmg the
Constitution than it does in construing a statute, McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819). aA4l its~lis-ai~mm:l ttnnightB"'guar~ S,. dts C81lSoti*tt;ie" !.! far gf~r.
2 It is settled that where discretion exists, a variety of -factors rooted in
the Constitution may lead a federal court to refuse to entertain an otherwise properly presented constitutional claim. See, e. g., Moore v. Sims,U.S.- (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v.
Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Iluffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975);
---ftml'l~~. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southe
. Co., 341 U. S. 341 (1951); Douglas v. City of Jeannette,
319 U. S. 157 (194 , urford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943); Railroad Commission v. Pul
nCo., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Ilawks v. Ilamill,
288 U. S. 52 ( 1933). Tra · ionally the issue has arisen in the context of
a federal court's exercise of i equity powers with respect to the States.
~ncerns of comityA hat govern our dealings with the States
should come into play when we are asked to interfere with the functioning
of Congress.

)
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Among those policies that a court certainly should consider
in deciding whether to imply a constitutional right of action is
that of comity toward an equal and coordinate branch of
government. As Chief Justice Waite observed over a century
ago, "One branch of government cannot encroach on the
domain of another without danger. The safety of our institutions depends in no small degree on a strict observance of this
salutary rule." Sinking Fund Cases, 9 Otto 700, 718 (1878).
Even where the authority of one branch over a matter is not
exclusive, so that a federal court properly may accept jurisdiction over the dispute, we have recognized that the principle of
separation of powers continues to have force as a matter of
policy. For example, in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S.
683 (1974), we held on the one hand that the question whether
the President had a claim of privilege as to conversations with
his advisers was an issue to be resolved by the judiciary, and
on the other hand that separation-of-powers considerations required the recognition of a qualified privilege.
similar
ach shoul ove
e.
Whether or not the employment decisions of a Member of
Congress fall within the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause
of the Constitutioif, a question the Court does not reach today,
It is clear that
are bound up with the conduct of
his duties. As THE CHIEF JusTICE observes, ante, a. Congressman necessarily relies heavily on his personal staff in discharging the duties of his office. Because of the nature of his
office, he must rely to an extraordinary extent on the loyalty
and compatibility of everyone who works for him. Cf. Elrod
v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 377-388 (1976) (PowELL, J., dissenting). A Congressman simply cannot perform his constitutional duties effectively, or serve his constituents properly,
unless he is supported by a staff in which he has total
confidence.
The foregoing would seem self-evident even if Congress had
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not indicat d
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It fails to weigh the legitimate interests of members of
Congress.

Indeed, the decision simply dismisses the

constitutional doctrine of separation of powers as if it were
immaterial.

In my view, the serious intrusion upon the

authority of members of Congress to choose and control their

~

own staffs cannot be justified.
A
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. tJOn, 65 Colum. L Jc Jon, see Wechsler, The Cot ongress to define the
Trust & Savings Co.· v ~~ll 1001, 1004-1008 (196;~ts a;d. the Constitu. ~ ' 281 U. S. 673, 682 1
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as support for the
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~he au}?.r~y of~ M~mber
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upon
of Conlress to choose tis own
staff s1mpl;z;nnot be J st1fied!
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4 The justification the Court relies upon is the duty of federal courts
to vindicate constitutional rights-a duty no one disputes. But it never
has been thought that this duty required a blind exercise of judicial power
without regard to other interests or constitutional principles. Indeed, it
would not be unnatural for Congress to consider today's action unwarranted
and to exercise its authority to reassert the proper balance between the
legislative and judicial branches. If the reaction took the form of limiting
the jurisdiction of federal courts, the effect conceivable could be to frustrate the vindication of rights properly protected by the Court.

